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SAVING DEMOCRACY: A BLUEPRINT FOR 
REFORM IN THE POST-CITIZENS UNITED 
ERA 
Jocelyn Benson* 
ABSTRACT 
Since the founding of our democracy, attempts to curb the 
influence of money in the political process consistently fall short of 
their goal.  In fact, a growing number of cynics see campaign finance 
reform—or any effort to reduce the impact of money in the political 
process—as inherently doomed to fail.  With the recent dearth of 
meaningful campaign finance reform on the federal level in the post-
Citizens United era, reform advocates must look to the states to 
explore and enact changes to the law that will promote a healthier 
role for money in politics.  This Article reviews efforts to reform 
government in response to a growing body of U.S. Supreme Court 
jurisprudence eliminating existing campaign finance regulations.  It 
analyzes four of the reforms gaining the most attention through the 
lens of how effectively each one advances one of the four primary 
interests that must drive the regulation of money in politics.  Those 
interests, described in Part I of the Article, are (1) The Equality 
Interest; (2) The Information Interest; (3) The Participation Interest; 
and (4) The Anti-Corruption Interest.  The Article ultimately asserts 
that each proposal, if championed alone, falls short of achieving 
reformers’ overall goal of a democracy that serves these four 
interests.  It further contends that effective reform can only succeed 
at furthering the above interests if it is a comprehensive combination 
of all of the proposals.  The Article concludes with a proposed road 
map towards advancing all reforms. 
  
 
* Jocelyn Benson, Dean of Wayne State University Law School and Director of the 
Michigan Center for Election Law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the founding of our democracy, attempts to curb the 
influence of money in the political process consistently fall short of 
their goal.  In fact, a growing number of cynics see campaign finance 
reform—or any effort to reduce the impact of money in the political 
process—as inherently doomed to fail.  The bulk of their argument is 
based upon the view that money is like water, and it will always find a 
way to influence the political ecosystem no matter how many barriers 
or regulations seek to mitigate that influence.1 
 
 1. For a longer discussion of the “hydraulic” nature of money in politics, see 
Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance 
Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705 (1999), Issacharoff and Karlan’s seminal piece on the 
subject. 
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But that view itself is not sufficient to reject wholesale ongoing 
attempts to improve democracy through reforms that will mitigate or 
even redirect the flow of money into a useful role in the political 
process.2  Such attempts are particularly critical at this stage of our 
electoral system.  The first century of our democracy was marked by 
wars over its strength and unification.  The second focused on 
expanding the electorate through extending the franchise to 
additional groups of citizens.  But the third, beginning roughly in the 
1970s, has thus far been dominated by a discussion of how to regulate 
the role of money and financial interests in the political arena.  That 
discussion has only increased in intensity in the years following the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. FEC,3 which 
widened the floodgates for money from corporate treasuries to flow 
into our democracy. 
This Article examines the myriad of state and federal efforts in the 
years since Citizens United that attempt to blunt the force of the 
decision or in other ways minimize the influence of money in 
American elections.  It begins first with an examination of the various 
interests of a healthy democracy that any regulatory system should 
seek to uphold.  In an effort to assess and construct the ideal, Part I 
seeks to answer the question: what is the “end goal” of political 
reformers and democratic defenders?  What are the values of a 
system in which elections are “clean?” 
Part II examines several possible reforms through the lens of both 
their legality and practicality, and their potential to further the 
interests established and discussed in Part I.  These reforms, ranging 
from disclosure requirements to citizen financing of campaigns to 
amending the U.S. Constitution, have each gathered steam in recent 
years, particularly after Citizens United.  This section seeks to analyze 
each in turn and evaluate whether and how an individual reform can 
accomplish the interests established in Part I. 
Part III focuses on how elements of each proposed change can and 
must combine into a larger, broader, and more comprehensive reform 
strategy.  In recognizing the importance of holistic reform to 
legitimately further the interests described in Part I, this section 
argues that such an approach is only possible if it originates through 
 
 2. See id. at 1708 (“[P]olitical money, like water, has to go somewhere. It never 
really disappears into thin air. . . .  [P]olitical money, like water, is part of a broader 
ecosystem.  Understanding why it flows where it does and what functions it serves 
when it gets there requires thinking about the system as a whole.”). 
 3. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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state-based, citizen-led coalitions that can work through petition 
processes and other methods. 
I.  THE GOAL 
Before we can examine and analyze several proposed reforms, it is 
important to establish overall the goals that regulating political 
money should achieve.  In other words: What is the endgame?  What 
are the characteristics of an ideal system? 
This section proposes four interests that any effort should seek to 
further and describes how current federal case law and other 
elements have combined in recent years to frustrate these interests.  
These four interests, while only partially recognized in current 
jurisprudence as compelling governmental interests justifying 
campaign finance regulations, are essential to protecting the fabric of 
a democracy that relies on participation and adequate representation. 
A. The Equality Interest: A Government of, by, and for the 
People 
The first, the “Equality” interest, suggests that everyone deserves 
an equal chance at influencing the political process.  Taken further, 
government should be “of, by, and for the people” and making 
decisions to advance the best interests of the electorate.4  And when 
that happens, substantive work of a governmental body should ideally 
align with the substantive goals of the electorate.  To that end, all 
voices, perspectives and viewpoints should, as much as practically 
possible, be represented and reflected in the governing body, and 
money should not be able to convert economic power into political 
power.5  The interest also assumes that the consistent absence of some 
 
 4. For a broader discussion of this interest see William J. Rinner, Note, 
Maximizing Participation Through Campaign Finance Regulation: A Cap and Trade 
Mechanism for Political Money, 119 YALE L.J. 1060 (2010).  “The equality 
justification for campaign finance regulation . . . considers the disproportionate 
influence over the political process that wealth affords as fundamentally incompatible 
with democratic norms. In the absence of regulation, citizens can translate wealth 
into systematic advantages and influence over this political process.” Id. at 1066–67 
 5. See Kurt Hohenstein, “Clio, Meet Buckley—Buckley, Clio”: Re-Introducing 
History to Unravel the Tangle of Campaign Finance Reform, 1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 
63 (2008); see also Scott M. Noveck, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the 
Legislative Process, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 75, 78, 82 (2010) (“The intimate 
relationship between money and politics thus creates a significant danger that 
economic inequality will translate into political inequality in ways that may be 
antithetical to certain democratic aspirations of our political system. . . .  The 
motivation of many campaign finance reform advocates thus can be traced back to a 
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perspectives, or the continual amplification of some “special” 
interests over others, will dampen the ability of a democracy to be 
truly representative.6 
Ensuring that private interests “could not seize control of the 
government and use its power for their private benefit” was a key 
interest of the founding fathers.7  In particular, in Federalist Paper 
No. 10, James Madison wrote extensively on the importance of 
ensuring that the government would not fall to the control of 
“factions.”8  More than 200 years later, U.S. Senator Tom Udall and 
others have observed that the “interests of corporations are 
exceedingly well represented in the public debate.”9  Noting that he 
fully supports “corporate involvement in our public dialogue,” his 
fear is that it may “lead to corruption or drown out the voices of 
individual citizens.”10  But the “real danger” of unlimited, 
unrestrained spending to influence elections, he writes, is that it gives 
entities who can afford it “[t]he power to control the political 
dialogue of campaigns” and the legislative process.11  As a result, he 
observes, “elected officials legislate on behalf of corporations, unions, 
and other powerful organizations instead of their constituents.”12 
Indeed, it was out of this desire to quell the undue influence of a 
select few over the policymaking for the many that compelled the first 
 
theoretical commitment to a view of democracy in which the legislative process 
should operate less like an auction, and more like a ‘one person, one vote’ 
election.”). 
 6. See id. (noting that the “substantive ends” this interest seeks include 
“preventing elections from going to the highest bidder, reducing excessive influence 
of the wealthy, and ensuring responsiveness to all constituents”). 
 7. Bradley A. Smith, The Myth of Campaign Finance Reform, 2 NAT’L AFF. 75, 
77 (2010), available at http://www.nationalaffairs.com/doclib/20091228_Smith.pdf 
(describing how “[f]iguring out how to keep special interests under control was a 
dilemma at the core of the Constitutional Convention”). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Tom Udall, Amend the Constitution to Restore Public Trust in the Political 
System: A Practitioner’s Perspective on Campaign Finance Reform, 29 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 235, 244 (2010). 
 10. Id. (describing how, in this post-Citizens United era, “[c]orporations spend 
large amounts of their general treasury money lobbying government officials and 
they raise campaign contributions through their Political Action Committees that 
allow both shareholders and employees to pool their resources for the purpose of 
express advocacy for or against a federal candidate”). 
 11. Id. at 235. 
 12. Id. at 235; see also id. (citing research suggesting that “nearly eighty percent of 
Americans agreed that members of Congress are controlled by special interest money 
to the exclusion of their constituents”). 
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regulations of money in the political system.13  In the mid- to late 
1800s, several banks and corporations began spending money to 
influence the election of candidates that would serve their interests.14  
Before long, political leaders began calling for a prohibition on 
corporate donations to campaigns.  One leading political activist in 
1894, Elihu Root, called for a prohibition on corporate political 
giving—specifically to prevent undue influence from this growing 
wealthy faction over the public policy activities of the federal 
government.  The goal of such a prohibition, he declared, would be to 
stop  
the great railroad companies, the great insurance companies, the 
great telephone companies, the great aggregations of wealth from 
using their corporate funds, directly or indirectly, to send members 
of the legislature to these halls in order to vote for their protection 
and the advancement of their interests against those of the public.15   
Soon after, Congress passed the first federal law to regulate spending 
on elections, the Tillman Act,16 which banned corporations and banks 
from making direct contributions to candidates and political 
campaigns. 
But in the century that followed, special interest funding found 
other ways to exert undue influence in a way that would influence 
policymaking.17  In particular, if corporations and unions could not 
make direct contributions to candidates and campaigns, they simply 
spent their money directly on commercials or other types of 
communication.18  Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court held that as 
 
 13. For a comprehensive treatment of the history and development of campaign 
finance regulations, see A Symposium on Campaign Finance Reform: Past, Present, 
and Future, 1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 1 (2008). 
 14. See Smith, supra note 7, at 78–79 (“In 1832, the Bank of the United States 
spent approximately $42,000—the equivalent of about a million dollars today, in 
inflation-adjusted terms—to try to defeat Andrew Jackson, who was seeking to 
revoke the bank’s charter.”). 
 15. Id. at 80. 
 16. Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (1907). 
 17. See, e.g., Emma Greenman, Strengthening the Hand of Voters in the 
Marketplace of Ideas: Roadmap to Campaign Finance Reform in a Post-Wisconsin 
Right to Life Era, 24 J. L. & POL. 209, 221–22 (2008) (suggesting that “[g]roup 
participation leads to undemocratic policy outcomes affecting the legislation pursued 
by elected officials once in office” and noting that reformers “have the obligation to 
pursue a strategy that will bolster popular representation and diversify citizen voices, 
within the current democratic context, a strategy that will strengthen the hand of 
voters in the ‘marketplace of ideas’”). 
 18. See Molly J. Walker Wilson, Behavioral Decision Theory and Implications for 
the Supreme Court’s Campaign Finance Jurisprudence, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 679, 
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long as these expenditures were made independently and without any 
coordination with the campaigns, they were not considered campaign 
contributions and therefore were permissible.19 
Today, whether political money flows through independent 
expenditures or direct contributions, the bulk of it originates from 
less than 2% of the electorate—meaning that our entire government 
is primarily influenced by 2%—not 100% or even 51%—of the 
eligible voting population.20  And this 2% is hardly a representative 
sample of the population.  Professor Spencer Overton estimates that 
the American “donor class” is mostly white (95.8%), male (70.2%), 
and wealthy—85.7% have annual family incomes of over $100,000.21 
This disproportionate influence yields skewed policy outcomes that 
favor the members of this “donor class,” often at the expense of 
everyone else.  Prominent reformer and Harvard Law professor 
Lawrence Lessig writes that this “increasing dependence of public 
officials upon private money to secure tenure” breeds “‘corruption’ in 
a less direct, more systems-based sense: that because these public 
officials depend upon private wealth to secure their tenure, they . . . 
become responsive to the concerns of that private wealth, so as to 
assure its continued supply.”22 
Thus, effective campaign finance reform must seek to minimize the 
undue influence that a select few wield over the political process and 
ensure that every voice is heard equally in the halls of our 
government.  It must recognize that the unequal influence of the 
select few leads to policies that favor the few unless everyone else can 
somehow match the resources of those with access to greater wealth.  
In the words of former United States Senator Bill Bradley: 
The truest model of how our republic is supposed to work is citizens 
speaking to their representatives and representatives responding to 
their constituents’ voices and concerns.  Big money . . . [is] like a 
 
718–19 (2010) (“When groups and individuals are able to spend theoretically 
unlimited amounts . . . [directly] on communication directed at the voting public, 
there is the potential for these groups to gain excessive influence over the 
electorate.”). 
 19. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (Colo. 
Republican II), 533 U.S. 431 (2001). 
 20. See Frank Pasquale, Reclaiming Egalitarianism in the Political Theory of 
Campaign Finance Reform, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 655 n.73 (2008) (citing Spencer 
Overton, The Donor Class: Campaign Finance, Democracy, and Participation, 153 U. 
PA. L. REV. 73, 102 (2004)). 
 21. See id. 
 22. Lawrence Lessig, What Everybody Knows and What Too Few Accept, 123 
HARV. L. REV. 104, 106–07 (2009). 
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great stone wall separating us from our representatives in Congress 
and making it almost impossible for them to respond to our 
commonsense request that they address the profound issues that 
affect all of us. . . .  The influence of the few deprives the people of 
their representation and undermines the republic.23 
B. The Information Interest: Preserving a Well-Informed 
Electorate 
There is nothing more essential to a democracy than a well-
informed electorate.  In 1822, James Madison stated that a “popular 
Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring 
it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both.”24  “[A] 
people who mean to be their own Governors,” he noted, “must arm 
themselves with the power which knowledge gives.”25 
For citizens to vote effectively for who will best represent their 
views and issues accurately in government, they must be informed 
about the candidates they are supporting.  To that end, any effort to 
regulate money’s influence in our democracy must accordingly 
minimize the ability of moneyed interests to drown out other voices 
that seek to influence and inform voters in the marketplace of ideas.  
Reforms enhance this “information” interest when they prevent the 
distorting effects that a small number of donors might have on 
political discourse. 
At its most primary level, elections are meant to serve as a 
mechanism for voters to express and debate their policy 
preferences—either through their support of certain candidates26 or 
through engaging in a deliberative form of discussion of issues, 
reforms, and solutions.27  Both are possible only where voters have 
 
 23. Mark C. Alexander, Citizens United and Equality Forgotten, 35 N.Y.U. REV. 
L. & SOC. CHANGE 499, 524 (2011). 
 24. Jarrod L. Schaeffer, The Incorporation of Democracy: Justice Kennedy’s 
Philosophy of Political Participation in Citizens United, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1783, 1814 
n.1 (2011). 
 25. Id. 
 26. See, e.g., Greenman, supra note 17, at 213 (“Elections provide a platform for 
public discussion on important issues.  They allow citizens the opportunity to 
evaluate candidates and engage other members of their community in dialogue about 
the values and policies that should drive government action.”). 
 27. See id. at 252 (“[D]emocracy is strengthened when there are structured public 
forums where community members can deliberate and engage community solutions 
to governing decisions or important social issues.  Citizens engage in substantive 
policy decisions and decisions about distributing and prioritizing public action.  In 
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access to information—including candidates’ positions and their 
records—that enables them to make choices that are consistent with 
their beliefs and preferences.28 
For the moment, despite living in a technological era where access 
to information is at its height, when it comes to policy and political 
information, voters are “malnourished.”29  Most studies and spending 
patterns suggest that attack ads and overly simplistic slogans play a 
large role in swaying voters’ preferences30 while providing little to no 
accurate information on the policy positions of candidates.31  In 
addition, most voters receive their information from sources that are 
inherently biased—namely, campaigns, candidates, or special interest 
groups.32  And as such, groups or individuals with access to money are 
likely to spend it on ads attacking candidates whose policies they 
oppose, because they believe it is the most efficient way to influence 
public opinion at a time (i.e., right before an election) when they can 
have the greatest impact.  In the absence of any limit on this practice, 
or any comparatively influential methods of delivering more accurate 
and nuanced information to the electorate, the ability of voters to 
make informed decisions is supplanted by ideologically driven 
dialogue and decision-making. 
 
community-based deliberative structures, citizens take part in dialogue and reach 
common ground on controversial issues in the public sphere.”). 
 28. See id. 
 29. See, e.g., Jeremy N. Sheff, The Myth of the Level Playing Field: Knowledge, 
Affect, and Repetition in Public Debate, 75 MO. L. REV. 143, 151 (2010) (“It is 
generally recognized in social science circles that American voters tend not to be 
especially well informed: The democratic citizen is expected to be interested and to 
be well informed about political affairs.  He is supposed to know what the issues are, 
what their history is, what the relevant facts are, what alternatives are proposed, what 
the party stands for, what the likely consequences are.  By such standards the voter 
falls short.”). 
 30. See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 1, at 1709 (describing how “spending 
patterns suggest that ‘political actors’ believe that mass media advertising—television 
spots, and, more particularly, attack ads or maudlin, emotion-laden pitches—is a 
particularly effective technique”). 
 31. See Sheff, supra note 29, at 152–53 (“[In the] low-information environment of 
American electoral politics, spending on campaign communications can affect voter 
knowledge, electoral or policy preferences, or voting behavior. . . .  In particular, 
political advertising appears to have the ability to implant emotional or affective 
attitudes toward its sponsors and subjects, though the positive or negative tenor of 
the ads can determine the polarity of these attitudes.”). 
 32. Greenman, supra note 17, at 215 (“Campaigns are the central opportunity for 
political parties, third party groups, individuals and candidates to participate, 
informing citizens about what the candidates stand for and believe, what they intend 
to accomplish, and what they have done while in office.”). 
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Opponents to efforts to regulate money to promote the 
informational interest argue that any restrictions on the free flow of 
information will distort the political debate.33  But this argument 
ignores the current fact that the debate is already distorted as a result 
of the current unequal flow of information to voters via wealthy 
groups and individuals engaging in the aforementioned practices.  
Further, a political structure that promotes an informed electorate 
should not involve the absence of these so-called “special” interests.  
It would simply ensure that the information, arguments, views, and 
perspectives that those interests provide are countered by equally 
informative viewpoints and data. 
But being fully “informed” as a voter also means being able to 
analyze and assess the information once received, and having access 
to information about its origins and source.  Thus, in addition to 
policy positions and perspectives, an informed electorate will have 
access to data on the sources of funding behind the communication—
i.e., political ads, publications, and the like—and the overall role of 
financial interests in shaping the political dialogue.34  Justice Kennedy 
recognized the importance of this interest in upholding disclosure 
requirements in Citizens United, noting that they “enable[] the 
electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to 
different speakers and messages.”35  Kennedy went on to note that 
with the 
advent of the Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures can 
provide shareholders and citizens with the information needed to 
hold corporations and elected officials accountable for their 
positions and supporters.  Shareholders can determine whether their 
corporation’s political speech advances the corporation’s interest in 
making profits, and citizens can see whether elected officials are ‘in 
the pocket’ of so-called moneyed interests.36 
 
 33. See David Axelman, Note, Citizens United: How the New Campaign Finance 
Jurisprudence Has Been Shaped by Previous Dissents, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 293 
(2010) (detailing Justice Kennedy’s view that once the government inhibits the free 
flow of information based on the financial resources of the speaker, it has distorted 
the political debate). 
 34. See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Disclosures About Disclosure, 44 IND. L. REV. 255, 
259 (2010) (“It is not simply enough to disclose contributor information.  While 
existing research indicates that such information may help inform voters, whether it 
has a reasonable chance of doing so depends both on what specific information is 
disclosed and how that information is disseminated.”). 
 35. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010) (plurality 
opinion). 
 36. Id. 
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C. The Participation Interest: Voters Need to Believe in the 
Process to be Engaged 
Democracy will only work if an electorate is informed.37  Empirical 
studies suggest that “[t]he role of voters in influencing the public 
debate and choosing a candidate will depend upon being able to 
navigate the expanded marketplace of competing ideas.”38  But 
importantly, an informed electorate is a participating electorate.  An 
increase in voter knowledge of the issues and candidates is directly 
related to voters’ level of participation.39  This connects to a third 
interest that democratic reforms should serve: the “participation” 
interest. 
Simply put, a central goal of efforts to regulate money in politics 
should be to maximize democratic participation, with a focus on 
encouraging greater participation among all eligible voters.40  In his 
seminal article proposing campaign finance reforms that promote 
 
 37. See Schaeffer, supra note 24, at 1783 (“From its founding, the American 
Republic has always depended for its subsistence on an informed and politically 
active citizenry.”). 
 38. Greenman, supra note 17, at 252; see also id. at 250 (describing a “robust and 
well-known field of scholarship tracing the decline of civic education in schools and 
its relationship to decreasing levels of political participation and political 
knowledge”). 
 39. See Benjamin Barber, Participatory Democracy, in POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: 
THEORIES, THINKERS, AND CONCEPTS 357 (Seymore Martin Lipset ed., 2001) (“[A]n 
enthusiasm for participatory democracy has been coupled with a zeal for public and 
civic education: the training of competent and responsible citizens.”); Greenman, 
supra note 17, at 249 (“Civic and political education is at the core of deepening and 
strengthening voters’ participation in democratic elections.  It is the foundation on 
which democratic deliberation and participation is built.  Citizen attainment of 
political knowledge through civic education has two important effects.  First, people 
with a higher level of political knowledge and a greater understanding of the way the 
process works are more likely to participate in every type of political activity. Second, 
greater political knowledge enhances the quality and sophistication of political 
participation.”). 
 40. See Rinner, supra note 4, at 1082 (“Campaign finance laws should both 
expand the pool of participants and reduce the barriers to entry for individuals who 
do participate in the political process.  In other words, reformers should seek to 
broaden the playing field” of participants in order to maximize participation.); see 
also Seymour Martin Lipset, Participation, Political, in 3 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
DEMOCRACY 913 (1995) (“Although popular participation does not by itself make a 
democracy, the opportunity for the average citizen to participate in the political 
process is essential for any democracy, and participation is often included in the 
definition of democracy.”); Greenman, supra note 17, at 214 (“Elections keep elected 
officials linked to the will of their constituencies.  The power to ‘throw the bastards 
out’ gives voters a key check on the policy-making decisions of their elected 
representatives.”). 
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more citizen participation in financing campaigns, Professor Spencer 
Overton emphasizes that the core value of participation in a 
democracy cannot be understated.41  Voter engagement promotes 
accountability, enabling citizens to communicate their preferences to 
their representatives.42  At its best, participation goes beyond casting 
a ballot and creates an ongoing conversation between the voter and 
their representative.43  In that way, citizen participation and 
engagement “exposes decisionmakers to a variety of ideas and 
viewpoints, ensuring fully informed decisions” and “enhances the 
legitimacy of government decisions, which increases the likelihood 
that citizens will voluntarily comply with such decisions.”44 
Fostering the active engagement of citizens in the self-governing 
process was a primary goal of our founding fathers, who looked to 
models of democracy that were dependent on universal participation 
in structuring our democratic system.45  The theme of participation is 
reflected through the United States Constitution, from the “We the 
People” opening through the Twenty-Sixth Amendment protecting 
the franchise for young citizens.46 
To that end, several studies suggest that such participation is 
dampened if the public perceives that the undue influence of a small 
number of wealthy interests47 will drown out their own influence.48  
 
 41. See Spencer Overton, The Participation Interest, 100 GEO. L.J. 1259, 1273–76 
(2012). 
 42. Id. at 1274. 
 43. See Saul Zipkin, The Election Period and Regulation of the Democratic 
Process, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 533, 533–35 (2010) (“Viewing citizens as 
intermittent ballot-casters limits the autonomy and sovereignty of the people relative 
to their rulers. . . .  [T]he vote presents but one (undoubtedly significant) moment in a 
larger continuing process of representative governance.”). 
 44. Spencer Overton, Campaign Finance After McCain-Feingold: The Donor 
Class, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 73, 101 (2004). 
 45. See, e.g., Lipset, supra note 40, at 921 (“In Athens in the fifth century B.C. the 
entire body of citizens met every seven to ten days in assembly to deliberate and pass 
laws, regulate trade, and make war and peace. . . .  In the classical scheme of 
classifying regimes . . . democracy meant participatory democracy, rule by the many 
in contrast with aristocracy and monarchy.”). 
 46. See Overton, supra note 41, at 1274–75 (“Several political rights in the U.S. 
Constitution [that] reflect the participation principle, including the rights of speech, 
assembly, and petition as well as the bar on denying the franchise based on race, 
gender, failure to pay a poll tax or other tax, or age to those who are at least eighteen 
years old.”). 
 47. See id. at 1259 (“Less than one-half of one percent of the population provides 
the bulk of the money that politicians collect from individual contributors.”). 
 48. See Greenman, supra note 17, at 217 (“Campaign spending thus subverts 
democratic notions of equal representation by increasing the threat of quid-pro-quo 
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Consider the data suggesting that, at least among reported 
contributions, the “donor class” is heavily skewed towards the small 
portion of the population who earn $100,000 or more.49  Allowing 
unrestrained or unregulated money to influence campaign 
communications and elected officials will thus reduce public 
confidence in the electoral process, diminishing voters’ desire to 
participate, and thereby ultimately reducing participation itself.50 
That said, there is scant empirical evidence to suggest that 
campaign finance regulations have succeeded in minimizing or 
decreasing this public cynicism.  There is also little to suggest that 
reforms have led to an increase in voter confidence in the political 
process.51 
But perhaps that is because the reforms are missing the mark.  An 
emerging school of thought that embraces the need to design 
campaign finance reforms to further the value of participation also 
supports moving the focus away from regulating money and towards 
encouraging more people to donate financially themselves, albeit at a 
“discounted rate.”52  Overton has similarly proposed a number of 
policies that can promote participation through facilitating small 
dollar donations from a greater number of people.53 
Finally, though most Justices have yet to describe the interest as 
“compelling,” several opinions from the U.S. Supreme Court suggest 
that many Justices view the participation rationale as an important 
 
corruption, furthering the public perception that money buys influence.”); Nathaniel 
Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign Finance: When 
Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 119 (2004) 
(finding an increase in public cynicism led Congress to pass the Bipartisan Campaign 
Finance Reform Act). 
 49. See Overton, supra note 41, at 1263 (noting that 80% of political contributions 
in 2004 came from individuals with family incomes over $100,000, who “represented 
11% of the population in 2004 and cast 14.9% of the votes”). 
 50. But see Rinner, supra note 4, at 1082–83 (disputing the idea that the public 
loses confidence in the democratic process if there is a sentiment that a small number 
of people exert undue influence over the political system). 
 51. See generally id. 
 52. Id. at 1104 (noting that “[i]ndividuals with the capacity and desire to influence 
the political process with money will find a way to do so,” and advocating for 
proposals that “encourage others to engage the political process by donating at a 
discounted rate”). 
 53. See Overton, supra note 41, at 1285–86; see also id. at 1261 (“Just as civic 
norms encourage all citizens to vote, a key goal of campaign finance should be to 
encourage everyone to make a financial contribution to a political candidate or a 
cause of his or her choice.”). 
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government interest.54  Professor Saul Zipkin noted that Justice 
Breyer’s majority opinion in McConnell embraced the potential 
interest of “advanc[ing] participation in self-government itself” as a 
novel basis for regulation.55  Breyer specifically described a “general 
participatory self-government objective.”56 
Justice Souter has also repeatedly expressed his concern about 
voter cynicism over large donors with disproportionate influence in 
Washington.  In Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to 
Life II, he lamented a decline in voter confidence in democratic 
government and “pervasive public cynicism.”57  In his majority 
opinion in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, he wrote that 
“the cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could 
jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic 
governance.”58  And in Citizens United, Justice Stevens’s partial 
concurrence noted Souter’s concern over “the legitimacy and quality 
of Government [and] also the public’s faith therein, not only ‘the 
capacity of this democracy to represent its constituents [but also] the 
confidence of its citizens in their capacity to govern themselves.’”59 
D. The Anti-Corruption Interest: Democracy Is Not for Sale 
The U.S. Supreme Court has found the government interest in 
reducing corruption—real or perceived—to be by far the preeminent 
and most compelling rationale for supporting campaign finance 
reform.60  It is a simple, but fundamental, requirement of democracy: 
elected officials and their votes should not be for sale to the highest 
bidder—and the public should trust that their leaders are immune 
 
 54. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 134 (2004) (citing Richard L. Hasen, Buckley Is Dead, Long 
Live Buckley: The New Campaign Finance Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal 
Election Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31 (2004)). 
 55. Zipkin, supra note 43, at 564. 
 56. Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 252 
(2002). 
 57. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (Wis. Right to Life II), 551 
U.S. 449, 507 (2007). 
 58. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390 (2000). 
 59. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (Stevens, J. 
concurring) (citing Wis. Right to Life II, 551 U.S. at 507 (Souter, J., dissenting)). 
 60. See Axelman, supra note 33, at 311–12 (“The interest in preventing 
corruption, or the appearance thereof, is the most longstanding and widely accepted 
government interest in campaign finance regulation.”). 
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from corruption.61  And though experts, jurists, reformers, and 
lawmakers may disagree on the scope of the definition of corruption,62 
most can agree that if a campaign donation causes an elected official 
to change their position on a piece of legislation or a ruling, that 
official is “corrupted.”63  At the very least, then, efforts to reform and 
limit the flow of money in politics need to confront and consider how 
to deter this type of quid pro quo corruption.64 
And indeed they have.  In the 1890s, the first campaign finance 
regulations emerged in response to a growing scourge of quid pro quo 
corruption in the halls of Congress and state legislatures.65  In 1894, 
future U.S. Senator and Nobel Peace Prize recipient Elihu Root 
urged the New York State Constitutional Convention to ban 
corporations and banks from contributing to political candidates.  He 
 
 61. See Philip M. Nichols, The Perverse Effect of Campaign Contribution Limits: 
Reducing the Allowable Amounts Increases the Likelihood of Corruption in the 
Federal Legislature, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 77, 82–90 (2011) (“In short, corruption destroys 
the connection between legislators and constituencies, distorts economies and the 
business environment, and undermines democratic legitimacy.”); see also Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (“The primary interest served by [campaign finance 
regulations] . . . is the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption 
spawned by the real or imagined coercive influence of large financial contributions 
on candidates’ positions and on their actions if elected to office.”). 
 62. See Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
341, 387–97 (2009) (detailing the court’s “Five Modern Concepts of Corruption”); see 
also Axelman, supra note 33, at 312 (“There is, of course, no uniform definition of 
corruption, and the appearance of corruption may often be in the eye of the beholder 
. . . .  The presence of actual, quid pro quo arrangements between officeholders (or 
candidates) and contributors would qualify as corruption under any accepted 
definition.”). 
 63. See Colo. Republican II, 533 U.S. 431, 441 (2001) (“Corruption [is] 
understood not only as quid pro quo agreements, but also as undue influence on an 
officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance of such influence.”); see, e.g., Scott M. 
Noveck, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Legislative Process, 47 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 75, 84 (2010) (“[P]olitical corruption consists of a public official consciously 
acting to advance the interests of an individual or group in exchange for some private 
gain, in a manner that she would not have acted but for the bribery, and without due 
regard for the effect upon the public interest or the interest of her constituents.”). 
 64. See Noveck, supra note 63, at 83 (“Campaign finance reform is necessary to 
limit ‘the extent to which a contributor can use money to secure special favors that 
the officeholder might not otherwise grant.’”). See generally Overton, supra note 41 
(describing how Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United narrowed the definition 
of “corruption” to almost solely cover quid pro quo arrangements). 
 65. See, e.g., Pasquale, supra note 20, at 603–04 (“The story of campaign finance 
reform properly begins in the Gilded Age, when a variety of political reform 
movements began to question the growing influence of trusts and other organized 
economic interests within the American democratic system. . . .  Graft and corruption 
had reached astonishing levels. . . .  Wealthy corporate interests tended to dominate 
national politics.”). 
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argued for the need to curb a “constantly growing evil” in which “the 
great railroad companies, the great insurance companies, the great 
telephone companies, the great aggregations of wealth from using 
their corporate funds, directly or indirectly, to send members of the 
legislature to these halls in order to vote for their protection and the 
advancement of their interests as against those of the public.”66 
A decade later, President Theodore Roosevelt—mired in 
accusations that corporate contributions corrupted his own 
presidential campaign67—called on Congress to prohibit corporations 
from contributing to political candidates.68  Soon after, Congress 
enacted the Tillman Act to prohibit corporations and banks from 
making direct contributions to campaigns.69  The Tillman Act only 
applied to direct contributions to campaigns.  It did not restrict 
corporations from independently spending their treasury dollars to 
influence the election or defeat of particular candidates.  Forty years 
later, Congress enacted the Taft-Harley Act to also prohibit 
independent expenditures by corporations and unions in federal 
elections.70  And following the Watergate scandal in 1974, Congress 
added teeth to their previous laws by requiring political action 
committees to disclose their contributions and strengthening 
reporting requirements for candidate committees.71  The Bipartisan 
Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) extended these 
regulations to all major campaign communications that mentioned a 
federal candidate close to an election,72 a regulation that was later 
struck down as unconstitutional in Citizens United v. FEC.73 
 
 66. Melvin I. Urofsky, Campaign Finance Reform Before 1971, 1 ALB. GOV’T L. 
REV. 1, 13 (2008) (citing ROOT, ADDRESSES ON GOVERNMENT AND CITIZENSHIP 143 
(Bacon and Scott eds., 1916)); see also Noveck, supra note 63, at 428 (citing Hearings 
before House Committee on Elections, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 12). 
 67. See Pasquale, supra note 20, at 608. 
 68. See Maxfield Marquardt, Citizens United: A World of Full Disclosure, 31 J. 
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 555, 556–57 (2011) (“After years of complaints by 
Democrats and Republicans alike that corporate moneyed interests influenced 
federal, particularly presidential, elections, President Theodore Roosevelt in 1905 
called for a prohibition on . . . [a]ll contributions by corporations to any political 
committee or for any political purpose.”). 
 69. See Federal Corrupt Practices Act (Tillman Act), Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 
864 (1907). 
 70. See Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), Pub. L. No. 80-101, 
61 Stat. 136 (1947). 
 71. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 
88 Stat. 201. 
 72. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 201, 116 
Stat. 81, 88–90, invalidated by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 
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Indeed, as efforts to limit corruption wove the fabric of campaign 
finance regulations on the federal level, it comes as no surprise that 
the U.S. Supreme Court cited the government’s interest in limiting 
the actuality and appearance of corruption74 as its justification for 
upholding state and federal limits on campaign contributions and 
disclosure requirements.75  The Court has not found that same interest 
as compelling in regulations on political expenditures,76 noting that 
the “absence of prearrangement and coordination” and the lack of 
potential for a political quid pro quo “alleviates the danger that 
expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper 
commitments from the candidate.”77  But despite this delineation, 
limiting the corrupting influence of both contributions and 
expenditures remains a significant motivation of reformers.78 
But to date, all of these and other efforts have failed to 
comprehensively halt corruption in the political process.79  
Lawmakers are still caught taking cash bribes, even in the wake of 
enacting stringent campaign finance regulations.80  Wealthy 
individuals and corporations are spending millions to elect Justices 
who will rule in their favor.81  Candidates seeking financial 
 
(2010); see also id. § 203, 116 Stat. at 91–92, invalidated by Wis. Right to Life II, 551 
U.S. 449 (2007). 
 73. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 74. See id. at 314. 
 75. See id. at 345 (summarizing the holding in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 
(1976)). 
 76. See id. at 327. 
 77. Id. at 345 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47). 
 78. But see Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 
1, 31 (2012) (noting that Citizens United “eliminated any discretion for courts and 
Congress to recognize a realistic risk of corruption from independent expenditures or 
electioneering communications”). 
 79. See Jon Simon Stefanuca, The Fall of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 
1971: A Public Choice Explanation, 19 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 237, 242 (2008) 
(“Despite the fact that the effort to provide for fair federal elections began over a 
century ago, [federal campaign finance law] has been inadequate . . . because political 
candidates are motivated to circumvent its spending limitations.”). 
 80. See, e.g., Nicholas Bamman, Campaign Finance: Public Funding After 
Bennett, 27 J.L. & POL. 323, 325 (2012) (describing how “[p]olice videotaped nearly 
10% of Arizona legislators and politicians accepting cash bribes totaling more than 
$370,000” shortly after the state enacted new campaign finance regulations); see also 
id. at 326 (recounting the prosecution of former Connecticut Governor John 
Rowland for accepting bribes from contractors in exchange for contracts with the 
state). 
 81. See Lessig, supra note 22, at 104 (noting how one wealthy businessman, Don 
Blankenship, directed $ 3 million of his personal funds to the end of electing a Justice 
to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in order “to influence the result in 
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contributions to win their campaigns are compelled to change their 
positions to curry favor with potential donors.82  And private 
companies seeking lucrative government contracts spend profits to 
curry favor with lawmakers charged with granting those contracts.83  
And while in many states, quid pro quo corruption may be outlawed 
under anti-bribery laws, those typically only deal with outlawing 
bribery in its most blatant and direct form and are designed primarily 
to punish offenders after the fact.  For that reason, campaign finance 
regulations can play a critical role in preemptively deterring the flow 
of money into situations where it can influence an elected official’s 
ability to serve the interests of their constituents. 
II.  THE REFORMS 
On January 21, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Citizens 
United v. FEC that corporations could use treasury funds to pay for 
independent expenditures and electioneering communications.84  In 
doing so, the Court ended nearly a century of restrictions and opened 
the door for a new source of funds for political ads and commercials. 
Almost immediately, this decision altered spending in the political 
arena.  Corporations and other financial interests had a long history 
 
an appeal of a case that would cost his company $50 million” and “use money to 
bring about a particular judicial result”). 
 82. See Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118, 121–
22 (2010) (emphasizing the “potential for the corruption of the candidates who [aim] 
to ingratiate themselves to their wealthy backers”). 
Lurking beneath the surface of all debates on campaign finance is a visceral 
revulsion over future leaders of state groveling for money.  The process of 
fundraising is demeaning to any claim of a higher calling in public service 
and taints candidates, policies, donors, and anyone in proximity to this 
bleakest side of the electoral process.  The intuition is that at some level 
money must be corrupting of the political process and that something must 
be done to limit the role of money in that process.  In turn, and almost 
inescapably, the same logic appears to lead to the belief that less money is 
better than more money, and that successful reform must bring down the 
cost of modern electoral campaigning. 
Id. at 118. 
 83. See, e.g., Kevin Weber, Unsuccessful Campaign Finance Reform: The Failure 
of New Jersey’s 2004–2005 Pay-to-Play Reforms to Curb Corruption and the 
Appearance of Corruption, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 1443, 1448–49 (2008) (detailing 
two New Jersey governors whose actions gave rise to an appearance of corruption 
when they granted government contracts to companies who had made contributions 
to their party’s campaign committees). 
 84. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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of spending money on issue-oriented communications,85 but the 
Court’s holding opened the doors for these entities to spend money 
directly on ads that would advocate expressly for or against a 
candidate.86  As a result, scholars noted several ways in which Citizens 
United may have led to a number of changes in the general election 
of 2010, including87: (1) an overall increase in the amount of money 
spent on political ads;88 (2) the growth of newly formed “super 
PACs,” designed to coordinate spending and strategy among 
corporations and wealthy donors;89 (3) corporate funds poured into 
independent expenditures;90 (4) political ads were more negative in 
tone;91 and (5) a larger percentage of money spent on the ads was 
undisclosed.92 
These effects directly impair the interests discussed in Part I.  An 
increase in negative ads and an imbalance in views presented to 
voters distort citizens’ ability to gain information about the 
candidates.93  They also increase cynicism and dampen public 
enthusiasm for participating in elections.94  The substantial escalation 
 
 85. See Richard Briffault, Corporations, Corruption, and Complexity: Campaign 
Finance After Citizens United, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLICY 643, 647–48 (2011). 
 86. See Lili Levi, Plan B for Campaign-Finance Reform: Can the FCC Help Save 
American Politics After Citizens United?, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 97, 119 (2011) 
(suggesting that “allowing corporations to advocate expressly for or against particular 
candidates, rather than masking such advocacy in issue-oriented language . . . 
enhanced the effectiveness of political messages by making them easier to decode”). 
 87. See id. at 111–12. 
 88. See id. at 110–11 (“Roughly $4 billion was spent on federal races in 2010, 
which amounts to almost twice the cost of the 2006 midterm elections.”). 
 89. See id. at 111 & n.85. 
 90. Id. at 113 (“Citizens United led to even greater spending by corporate-funded 
outside groups than political observers expected.” (quoting PUB. CITIZEN, 12 
MONTHS AFTER: THE EFFECTS OF CITIZENS UNITED ON ELECTIONS AND THE 
INTEGRITY OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/citizens-united-20110113.pdf) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 91. Id. at 114. 
 92. Id. at 115 (one source estimating that “groups that do not disclose their 
contributors spent an estimated $138 million of the $300 million total spent in 2010”); 
see also id. at 116 (describing an increase in undisclosed spending and noting that 
“[g]roups that failed to disclose any donor information in the 2010 election cycle 
collectively spent roughly double the grand total spent by outside groups in the 2006 
cycle” and citing another report that “showing that the percentage of such spending 
rose from one percent to forty-seven percent since the 2006 midterm elections”). 
 93. Id. at 98. 
 94. See id. at 120 (noting that the increased spending on negative ads by outside 
groups in 2010 “generate voter disaffection, even as they provide policy information,” 
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in corporate and special interest money spent independently on 
commercials increases their ability to influence elected officials, 
leading to a potentially larger imbalance in policies favoring these 
interests over the interest of the people.  And despite the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s skepticism,95 at least one other State Supreme 
Court96 has noted that increased spending can corrupt the political 
process. 
In the post-Citizens United era, reformers have advanced various 
state and federal level changes that seek to address the negative 
impact of the decision.97  Four of the most prominent are: (1) 
increased disclosure requirements; (2) citizen financed campaigns 
(“public financing”); (3) amendment the United States Constitution 
to overturn the central holdings in Buckley and Citizens United that 
political spending is the equivalent of political speech; and (4) 
protections and regulations that give shareholders greater power and 
authority over corporate money spent on political communications. 
Each of these proposals has its strengths, and none are mutually 
exclusive.  But in the years since Citizens United, instead of 
developing a comprehensive strategy for accomplishing all of these 
changes, reform efforts have proceeded in a piecemeal fashion.  The 
most well-funded and organized efforts seem to champion one of 
these four suggested changes—often at the expense of supporting the 
others.  At the federal level, individual bills have proceeded 
concurrently and separately to mandate disclosure of most money in 
the political system,98 publicly financed congressional campaigns,99 or 
amend the U.S. Constitution.100  State-based efforts and coalitions 
similarly have focused on one narrow reform instead of developing a 
comprehensive and broader strategy.  For example, Michigan’s 
 
and are “likely to increase cynicism, especially among the non-aligned voters whom 
both sides aim to persuade”). 
 95. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 391-92 (2010). 
 96. Grady v. City of Livingston, 141 P.2d 346 (Mont. 1943). 
 97. Thomas E. Mann, Campaign Finance in the Wake of Citizens United, 44 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 583, 588–89 (2011) (describing efforts at the federal level to enact 
increased disclosure requirements, public financing, and revitalize the FEC). 
 98. See Democracy Is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections 
Act (DISCLOSE Act), H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. (2d Sess. 2010). 
 99. See Let the People Decide Clean Campaign Act (Obey Bill), H.R. 158, 111th 
Cong. (2009); H.R. 2817, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 4694, 109th Cong. (2006) 
(mandating publicly financed congressional campaigns); The Fair Elections Now Act, 
H.R. 1404, 112th Cong. (2011) (a voluntary public financing system that also 
incentivizes small contributions). 
 100. Udall, supra note 9, at 249. 
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Transparency Coalition is pushing for instant disclosure,101 New York 
and California’s clean elections campaigns focus on public 
financing,102 while in 2012 efforts in Colorado and Montana focused 
on resolutions in support of amending the U.S. Constitution.103 
The following analysis evaluates each of these reforms through the 
lens of how they further the above-mentioned values.  Each of these 
individual reforms is distinct from the others, but all are mutually 
critical to protecting the health of our democracy.104  But each reform 
on its own falls short of the end goal of ensuring a democracy in 
which all voices are heard, voters are informed and engaged, and 
corruption is minimized or eradicated.  As such, efforts to regulate 
money in the political process must advance all four of these reforms, 
and more, as part of a comprehensive effort to reshape how political 
campaigns are funded and how voters receive information about 
candidates.  Reform efforts must begin embracing a more 
comprehensive approach if their efforts are to yield any benefit in 
furthering the four interests outlined above. 
A. Reform 1: Disclosure and the Information Interest 
In June 2011, FCC Commissioner Michael Copps stated:  
[T]he sooner we can ensure fuller disclosure of political advertising 
sponsorship, the better off our democracy will be.  Voters have a 
right to know who is really behind all those glossy and sometimes 
wildly misleading ads we see on TV.  Concealing from voters that an 
ad brought to us by “Citizens for a More Beautiful America” is 
really sponsored by a cabal of chemical companies polluting the 
 
 101. See, e.g., Mildred Gaddis, Jocelyn Benson Speaks Out Against Shadowy 
Corporate Special Interest Spending, NEWS TALK WCHB (Sept. 28, 2012), 
http://wchbnewsdetroit.com/2423053/jocelyn-benson-speaks-out-against-shadowy-
corporate-special-interest-spending/; Cameron Stewart, Stateside: Lobbying in 
Michigan, the ‘Wild, Wild West,’ MICH. RADIO (Oct. 22, 2012, 1:46 PM), 
http://www.michiganradio.org/post/stateside-lobbying-michigan-wild-wild-west. 
 102. See, e.g. Thomas Kaplan, Groups Push to Highlight Campaign Finance 
Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/22/ 
nyregion/groups-push-to-highlight-campaign-finance-reform-in-new-york.html; see 
also Learn the Basics, CALI. CLEAN MONEY CAMPAIGN, http://www.caclean.org/ 
faq/basics.php (last visited May 7, 2013). 
 103. See Constitutional Amendment Approved, 2012 Mont. Laws Balt. Meas. 166 
(S.B. 166); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-45-103.7 (West 2012). 
 104. See, e.g., Overton, supra note 41, at 128 (“[A]lthough participation is distinct 
from anticorruption, the two concepts are intertwined.  Widespread participation 
prevents corruption by diversifying a candidate’s support so that she is less beholden 
to a narrow group of large donors.  Similarly, preventing corruption and the 
appearance of corruption is said to promote participation.”). 
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water we drink is not just non-disclosure—it is deception aimed at 
buying elections.105 
Copp’s remarks underscore the threat that undisclosed money in 
politics poses to our democracy.  And it is an impact that is growing.  
The Center for Responsive Politics,106 a nonpartisan think tank that 
tracks money and spending in American politics, reported that 
spending on political ads by groups that are not required to fully 
disclose their donors107 has increased from $32 million in mid-
September of the 2008 election, to more than $135 million at the same 
point (mid-September) in the 2012 election.108  A report from another 
good-government nonprofit, Public Citizen, noted that only about 
half of groups spending money on political ads disclosed the sources 
for their funding in 2010, and that of the $300 million spent by non-
candidate groups in 2010, 46% was spent by organizations “that did 
not reveal where their money came from”—including seven of the ten 
biggest spending groups.109  In addition, some PACs and other groups 
that are, at least at the federal level, required to disclose their donors 
simply refused to comply with the law and chose to simply pay any 
fines levied by the Federal Elections Commission.110 
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that disclosure 
requirements directly further the informational and anti-corruption 
interests, even suggesting that they are critical to both.  In Buckley v. 
Valeo, the Court held that disclosure requirements usually “curb[] the 
evils of campaign ignorance and corruption”111 by “exposing large 
 
 105. Levi, supra note 86, at 129. 
 106. See CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POL., http://www.opensecrets.org/ (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2013). 
 107. The primary entities engaged in undisclosed spending in this regard are 
corporations—including tax-exempt organizations organized under 501(c) of the 
federal tax code.  Specifically, these groups are not required to disclose the donors 
that make their political spending possible.  The only exceptions are labor unions 
organized under 501(c)(5), which are required to provide detailed financial 
information to the Department of Labor annually, albeit after voters have gone to 
the polls. See Office of Labor-Management Standards (OLMS), U.S. DEP’T LABOR, 
http://www.unionreports.gov (last updated May 23, 2012). 
 108. See Robert Maguire, What Citizens United (et al) Wrought: The Shadow 
Money Explosion, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POL. (Sept. 18, 2012, 12:53 PM), 
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/09/what-citizens-united-et-al-wrought.html. 
 109. Citizens United: One Year Later, PUB. CITIZEN (Jan. 21, 2011), 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/CU-One-Year-After.pdf. 
 110. See Levi, supra note 86, at 115 (also noting that “even with groups that do 
comply, disclosures generally are not publicly available without some significant time 
lags”). 
 111. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67–68 (1976). 
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contributions to the light of publicity.”112  The majority opinion 
discussed in particular how disclosure laws serve the anticorruption 
interest because they “discourag[e] those who would use money for 
improper purposes either before or after the election” because the 
“public [is] armed with information” from campaign finance 
disclosure.113  In a footnote to this passage, the Court suggests that 
disclosure protects the information value through the work of the free 
press: “Informed public opinion is the most potent of all restraints 
upon misgovernment.”114 
The Court goes even further to endorse the importance of 
disclosure in informing the electorate in Citizens United.115  The 
Court describes disclosure as vital to promoting transparency, which 
“enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper 
weight to different speakers and messages.”116  Justice Kennedy also 
emphasizes that disclosure “permits citizens and shareholders to react 
to [political] speech of corporate entities in a proper way.”117 
The Supreme Court has found repeatedly that disclosure is on firm 
constitutional ground,118 and is critical to advancing the information 
interest.  Scholars concur,119 though some question the usefulness of 
 
 112. Id. at 67. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 96 n.79 (quoting Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 115. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 370–71 (2010). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See Cory G. Kalanick, Note, Blowing Up the Pipes: The Use of (c)(4) to 
Dismantle Campaign Finance Reform, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2254, 2280 (2011) (noting 
that disclosure requirements “avoid[] the complex constitutional questions raised by 
the Court’s jurisprudence on contribution and expenditure limits” but could be 
“challenged based on arguments of ‘compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups 
engaged in advocacy’” that the Court has previously held to violate First Amendment 
associational freedoms). 
 119. See, e.g., Anthony Johnstone, A Madisonian Case for Disclosure, 19 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 413, 422 (2012) (describing “the informational interest” as “the most 
important remaining justification for generally applicable campaign finance 
disclosure laws”); Mayer, supra note 34, at 258–71 (discussing whether disclosure and 
disclaimer rules result in more informed citizens); Noveck, supra note 64, at 76 
(arguing that disclosure laws provide “a rich and valuable source of information to 
aid both voters and policymakers alike”); Ciara Torres-Spelliscy & Ari Weisbard, 
What Albany Could Learn from New York City: A Model of Meaningful Campaign 
Finance Reform in Action, 1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 194, 223 (2008) (“Without strong 
disclosure requirements, voters lack important information that allows them to 
evaluate candidates.”). 
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the information in educating voters.120  Full disclosure enables citizens 
(and the press) to link a politician’s actions to the donations they 
receive, and evaluate whether she is acting at the behest of her donors 
or on behalf of her constituents.  It also deters the ability of 
candidates to fabricate stories about who is influencing or corrupting 
their opponent, thus minimizing the ability of false information to 
confuse voters.121  On the flip side, it can give voters “useful 
shortcuts” by providing information on which organizations are 
supporting candidates and reveal the intensity of those groups’ 
support.122  Disclosure also enables voters to evaluate a candidate 
through revealing demographic data about their supporters—where 
they are from, who they are, whether they are male or female.123 
All of these aspects of disclosure laws help further the anti-
corruption interest as well.  In fact, some experts have gone so far as 
to suggest that disclosure is “one of the only tools that reformers have 
to reduce corruption.”124  And while anti-bribery laws are designed to 
curb and deter quid pro quo corruption, disclosure empowers citizens 
themselves to evaluate whether certain donors are corrupting their 
 
 120. Some scholars argue that limited and superficial forms of information add 
little to the deliberative quality of public discourse. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 34, at 
270 (“[W]hile existing research indicates that such information may help inform 
voters, whether it has a reasonable chance of doing so depends both on what specific 
information is disclosed and how that information is disseminated.”); id. at 262 (“The 
disclosure of financial contributors will rarely, if ever, directly inform voters about 
the qualifications or policy positions of candidates.”); Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Hiding 
Behind the Tax Code, the Dark Election of 2010 and Why Tax-Exempt Entities 
Should Be Subject to Robust Federal Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws, 16 NEXUS: 
CHAP. J.L. & POL’Y 59, 62 (2011) (noting that it is not likely that “every voter will 
pour through campaign disclosure filings to find out who is funding each and every 
race on the November ballot”); Daniel Winik, Note, Citizens Informed: Broader 
Disclosure and Disclaimer for Corporate Electoral Advocacy in the Wake of Citizens 
United, 120 YALE L.J. 622, 637 (2010) (suggesting that “requiring political ads to 
include the speaker’s name will do little to improve their informational value”). 
 121. See Carson Griffis, Ending a Peculiar Evil: The Constitution, Campaign 
Finance Reform, and the Need for a Change in Focus After Citizens United v. FEC, 
44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 773, 793 (noting that since disclosure reveals “the source of 
campaign advertisements and contributions, there is less opportunity to mislead 
voters about what position a group is supporting”). 
 122. Levi, supra note 86, at 143–44. 
 123. See Noveck, supra note 63, at 112–13 (“[The donor’s] characteristics often 
correlate with [a candidate’s] view on many issues, but . . . there is something very 
troubling if a candidate systematically fails to obtain meaningful support from 
discrete and identifiable groups such as women or ethnic minorities. . . .  [I]t is 
important that these statistics be disclosed so that the public may recognize and 
address these problems.”). 
 124. Bamman, supra note 80, at 330. 
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leaders.125  It also may be the only policy, other than pure limitations 
on spending, that can curb the flow of money’s influence through 
providing a needed check on the process.  Though disclosure laws do 
not eliminate the ability for special interest money to corrupt the 
process,126 some politicians, knowing that disclosure enables voters, 
reporters, and one’s opponents to immediately learn who funded a 
particular ad would encourage the rejection of any donations or 
actions that would lead to the appearance of inappropriate 
relationships with large-scale political donors.127 
Disclosure has a less direct impact on promoting voter 
participation and the equality of voices in the political process.  If 
citizens know who funded a particular advertisement, not only can 
they credit or discount the advertisement’s message, but they can also 
better craft a public response—thereby potentially diminishing the 
risk that well-financed interests will drown out other voices by 
flooding the airwaves.  It also gives citizens the knowledge to respond 
to a corporation’s excessive spending or unfair advertising with their 
pocketbooks, indirectly increasing their participation or engagement 
in political discourse.  For example, in 2010, Target Corporation was 
heavily criticized after it was revealed that the company supported a 
Republican candidate for Governor in Minnesota who opposed same-
sex marriage.128  In the aftermath of the disclosure of this donation, a 
significant amount of backlash tarnished Target’s public image.  
There was an abundance of bad press, lost sales, and calls for 
boycotts.129  Ultimately, the CEO of Target issued a public apology to 
all of his company’s employees for the negative impact of the 
 
 125. See Johnstone, supra note 119, at 437 (suggesting that disclosure laws enable 
“voters rather than legislators or criminal juries” to judge whether a donor’s 
influence is undue).  “Disclosure thus delegates the question of what appears corrupt 
to the people themselves, and thus away from legislatures and courts.” Id. 
 126. See Udall, supra note 9, at 249 (arguing that “such narrowly tailored laws will 
not eliminate the large influx of special interest money that will result due to Citizens 
United, and thus these laws will not fully address this newest loophole for 
corruption”). 
 127. See Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 120, at 93 (“[D]isclosure requirements reduce 
the appearance of corruption by informing voters of the possibility that candidates 
have made deals with generous supporters.  The disclosure reports expose 
contributors to whom candidates are beholden for campaign funding and thereby 
make quid pro quo arrangements less likely.”). 
 128. See Jonathan Romiti, Note, Playing Politics with Shareholder Value: The 
Case for Applying Fiduciary Law to Corporate Political Donations Post-Citizens 
United, 53 B.C. L. REV. 737, 743–45 (2012). 
 129. See id. at 743-44. 
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donation, assuring them that the ill-advised action would not occur 
again.130 
All this has led to several attempts at the state and federal level to 
increase disclosure of political money as a way of furthering all of 
these interests.  Any standard disclosure reform should cover (1) 
public communications131 that (2) any corporation or union funds132—
partially or fully133—and that (3) can reasonably be expected to 
influence an election.134  It should also require the information to be 
disclosed as close to immediate as possible, and in a way that is 
readily and widely accessible.135  It should also include a disclaimer 
requirement, identifying the funding source for the communication 
on the message itself.136 
 
 130. See id. at 744. 
 131. See Winik, supra note 118, at 651 (“Corporations may communicate their 
political preferences internally to employees, directors, and shareholders” but if the 
government were to regulate those internal communications, it would raise more 
serious First Amendment concerns than by regulating public communications, 
because the government’s interests in the area of internal corporate speech are less 
compelling.”). 
 132. See id. at 652 (discussing “whether a regulation covers communications 
funded by corporations or only those ‘spoken’ by corporations in the most immediate 
sense,” and noting that “[i]f a regulation covers only the immediate transmitters of 
electoral advocacy, then corporations will inevitably create and fund other shell 
organizations to speak for them or aggregate their speech so that no one speaker can 
be identified”). 
 133. E.g., id. (“If Walmart were to fund ten percent of a Chamber of Commerce 
ad, for example, such a standard would require that the ad carry the Walmart name. 
The same would be true if Walmart were to pay some little-known affiliate to run the 
ad.”). 
 134. See id. at 653 (“[D]isclosure and disclaimer rules might apply to 
communications reasonably calculated to influence an election” and that “one could 
define ‘influence’ to include only direct advocacy of electoral outcomes or to cover 
mere reference to electoral outcomes.”). 
 135. See Francis Bingham, Note, Show Me the Money: Public Access and 
Accountability After Citizens United, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1027, 1061 (2011) (“Any 
reform attempt should include a strengthened disclosure framework to promote 
informed voting decisions through prompt, relevant, and accessible information 
about each political message. . . .  One goal should be to give viewers readily 
accessible information online about each particular ad’s financial and ideological 
support.”). 
 136. See id. at 1062 (suggesting a technology code on each communications). 
For example, if a financial services firm buys an ad asserting that Senator 
Smith opposes tax breaks for the middle class, the end of the ad would 
contain a simple identifying code and a copy of the FEC’s website.  The 
curious viewer could then enter that code on the website and view the ad’s 
funding sources.  In addition, to address the potentially misleading effect of 
unions or corporations using shell advocacy organizations to produce 
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Most proposed disclosure reforms typically include many of these 
components.  For example, Congressional leaders recently introduced 
the Democracy Is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in 
Elections Act (DISCLOSE Act)137 shortly after the Citizens United 
decision.  The Act sought to require all corporations, including 
nonprofits and labor unions, to disclose all contributions and 
expenditures over $10,000, and to disclaim their top five corporate 
contributors.138  It exempted nonprofit organizations with more than 
500,000 dues-paying members in all fifty states, D.C., and Puerto 
Rico, organizations with less than fifteen percent of its revenue from 
corporations and labor unions, and those that did not spend any of 
their revenue from corporations and labor unions on campaign-
related activity.139  Similar efforts are underway in Michigan and other 
states to require corporations to instantly disclose any funds spent on 
state-level campaign and lobbying communications.140 
 
campaign ads that hide the ad’s true financial sources, the disclosure report 
should include a list of the top financial sources of each organization. 
Id. 
 137. Democracy Is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections 
(DISCLOSE) Act, H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. (2d Sess. 2010). 
 138. Id. 
 139. See id.  Other federal regulatory reforms have been discussed as well. See, 
e.g., Kalanick, supra note 116, at 2279–83 (describing other federal regulatory 
reforms that can promote disclosure); Brian P. Flaherty, Note, Election 2010: The 
Loophole Created by 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(c)(9) and Citizens United and the 
Ineffectiveness of the Campaign-Finance-Law Framework in Iowa, 97 IOWA L. REV. 
239, 270–72 (2011). 
 140. See Rob South, Michigan Democrats Are Taking 1st Shot at Corporate 
Funding with Proposed Ethics, Campaign Finance Reform, MLIVE.COM (Feb. 2, 
2012), http://www.mlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2012/02/michigan_democrats_are_ 
taking.html.  Several states already require significant disclosure. See Winik, supra 
note 118, at 629–30 (“Thirty-four states require disclosure of independent 
expenditures.  They generally hew to the definition of independent expenditures 
outlined above, though some do not make explicit the requirement that advocacy be 
‘express,’ and others do not mandate that the candidate in question be ‘clearly 
identified.’  A few definitions do not use the term ‘advocacy’ at all.  Of the thirty-four 
states that require disclosure for independent expenditures, ten also require 
disclosure for electioneering communications.  North Carolina requires disclosure for 
a third category of speech, which it dubs ‘candidate-specific communications.’  
Arizona and Utah impose disclosure requirements specific to corporate independent 
expenditures.  And Hawaii and Vermont require disclosure for electioneering 
communications but not independent expenditures.”). 
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B. Reform 2: Citizen-Financed Elections and the Equality 
Interest 
At the state and federal level, publicly financed elections help 
candidates spread their message while absolving them of many of the 
pressures of raising funds to support their candidacy.  In general 
terms, they require that the government treasury give cash grants to 
candidates for campaign funding, and the candidate agrees to eschew 
private donations and, in some cases, accept spending limits.141 
Citizen-funded presidential campaigns took center stage in the 
1974 Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA).142  FECA established a 
system and spending limits for publicly financed presidential 
elections, funded solely via an individual tax checkoff on federal tax 
returns.143  FECA also created the Federal Elections Commission to 
administer the program and evaluate the eligibility of candidates and 
allocation of funds.  Under the program, the presidential nominee of 
each major party is eligible for a grant to support their campaign.  
Since its creation, the Presidential Election Campaign Fund has spent 
nearly $900 million to support presidential aspirants.144  In 2012, the 
grant is approximately $91,241,400 for each major party nominee.145  
 
 141. Bamman, supra note 80, at 3337–40. 
 142. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93-443, 88 Stat. 
1263 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 18, and 26 U.S.C.), partially 
invalidated by Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
 143. The “checkoff” amount is currently $3. Presidential Election Campaign Fund, 
FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, http://www.fec.gov/press/bkgnd/fund.shtml (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2013) (“Money for public funding of presidential elections can come only 
from the PECF.  If that Presidential Fund runs short of funds, no other general 
Treasury funds may be used.”); see also The $3 Tax Checkoff, FED. ELECTION 
COMMISSION, http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/checkoff.shtml (last visited Mar. 
26, 2013). 
 144. John Doolittle, The Case for Campaign Finance Reform, J. IDEAS, 
http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/0817996729_307.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2013). 
 145. With the exception of the 2008 Democratic presidential nominee, Barack 
Obama, every major party nominee has accepted the general election grant since the 
program’s inception in 1976. Chen Li, Public Funding After Davis v. FEC: Is 
Campaign Finance Reform in the States Still Legally Viable?, 20 GEO. MASON U. 
C.R. L.J. 279, 279–80 (2010) (“One of the keys to President Obama’s victory was a 
$400 million fundraising advantage over his opponent, Senator John McCain, who 
opted to accept $84 million in public funding and the accompanying spending 
restrictions for the general election. President Obama’s decision to build his 
campaign war chest through private donations rather than public funds continued a 
trend that began in 2000, when then-Governor George Bush became the first major-
party candidate to reject public funds for the primaries in favor of unlimited spending 
that private financing would allow.  Other prominent candidates, such as Senator 
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If they accept the grant, they may not raise any other funds to be used 
for campaigning during the general election period.146 
Several efforts to extend this program to congressional elections 
have floated unsuccessfully through Congress in recent years—
Minnesota Congressman David Obey (D-Minn.) has proposed the 
“Let the People Decide Clean Campaign Act,” which would require 
all candidates for Congress to participate in a public funding system, 
eschew any private campaign contributions, and accept spending 
limits.147  The Fair Elections Now Act, introduced by Senator Dick 
Durbin (D-Ill.) in the Senate and Representatives John Larson (D-
Conn.) and Walter Jones, Jr. (R-N.C.) in the House, proposed a 
system where participating candidates receive a grant, matching funds 
for small donor contributions, and vouchers for broadcast 
communications.148  The reform incentivizes small contributions from 
within candidates’ own states and would not impose spending limits 
on participants as long as they agreed to limit private individual 
contributions to no more than $100.149 
 
John Kerry, followed the trend by declining public funds for the 2004 Democratic 
primaries.  Then, in 2008, the two leading Democratic Party candidates, Senator 
Hillary Clinton and then-Senator Barack Obama, both chose to forego public funds 
for the primaries and the general election.  The generous funding that these 
candidates amassed have sparked debate over whether public financing would 
remain viable for presidential races.”). 
 146. See id. Ironically, this reform was the direct impetus for the growth of 
independent organizations, which then became the primary receptors of the bulk of 
private funds seeking to influence and elect a President.  Because Presidential 
candidates participating in the program could not receive private funds, those funds 
are then attracted to other entities, including political parties, and those entities then 
supply a great deal of the support for or against a particular candidate. 
 147. See Fair Elections Now Act, S. 752, 111th Cong. (2009). But see Udall, supra 
note 9, at 236 (suggesting that the Obey proposal may violate current Supreme Court 
constitutional jurisprudence). 
However, if any provision of [Obey’s] bill were ruled unconstitutional, it 
also provides an expedited legislative procedure for Congress to consider a 
constitutional amendment allowing broad regulation of the campaign 
finance system.  Rather than trying to tailor a bill that would withstand 
judicial scrutiny, the Obey bill directly addresses the most egregious 
problems of the system and allows for a constitutional amendment to be 
considered if it becomes necessary. 
Id. at 247. 
 148. See Udall, supra note 9, at 248. 
 149. See id. (“[I[t is hard to believe that the proposed legislation would fix the 
fundamental problems of the campaign finance system.  Because the system is 
voluntary, candidates who choose to participate would likely be grossly outspent by 
wealthy opponents who do not participate.  Participants would also still be required 
to spend significant amounts of time raising small dollar contributions.  Finally, the 
bill fails to address the problem of unlimited spending by corporations or interest 
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Multiple states have established citizen-funded campaign regimes 
for their state office candidates.  The first statewide fund to cover all 
statewide and legislative offices was established in Maine in 1996,150 
followed by Arizona two years later.151  To receive public funding 
under either program, candidates must collect a specified number of 
signatures and $5 qualifying contributions from registered voters 
within a designated time period, agree to refrain from fundraising, 
accept no private donations, and limit expenditures to the amount 
provided by the public campaign financing (PCF) program.152  The 
programs are funded through a combination of tax checkoffs, fines 
and penalties for the violation of any campaign financing or reporting 
law, and unused funds from previous elections.153 
Until recently, most of these models also have included a capped 
matching fund provision in case a nonparticipating opponent—or an 
independent entity—outspends the publicly financed candidate.154  
But in 2011, one year after Citizens United, the Supreme Court struck 
down these matching fund provisions in Arizona Free Enterprise 
Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett.155  The Court held that the law 
impermissibly burdened the First Amendment rights of privately 
funded candidates and independent political organization because it 
forced them to either restrain their spending or risk triggering 
matching funds to their publicly financed opponents.156  Chief Justice 
Roberts wrote for the majority that the “First Amendment embodies 
our choice as a nation that, when it comes to such speech, the guiding 
principle is freedom—the ‘unfettered interchange of ideas’—not 
 
groups left open by Citizens United, leaving publicly financed candidates at a severe 
disadvantage if they are negatively targeted by well-funded special interests.”). 
 150. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21A, §§ 1121–28 (2008); see also Emily C. 
Schuman, Davis v. Federal Election Commission: Muddying the Clean Money 
Landscape, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 737, 743 (describing Maine’s program as the 
“standard Clean Money model” for other states to follow). 
 151. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-940 to -961 (2003). 
 152. Michael Clyburn, Public Campaign Financing: The Path from Plutocracy to 
Pluralism, 7 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 285, 288 (2008).  Candidates are also permitted to 
privately raise $100 per contributor in seed money to fund their efforts to qualify for 
the fund. See id. at 290. 
 153. In Maine there is a $3 checkoff; Arizona’s is $5. See id. at 291. 
 154. See id. at 288–89 (“In Maine, the matching funds are limited to two times the 
original amount distributed for a primary or general legislative election, and for a 
gubernatorial primary.  The matching fund for the gubernatorial general election is 
limited to the amount of the original distribution.  In Arizona, the total distribution is 
limited to three times the original spending limit for any particular campaign.”). 
 155. 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011). 
 156. See id. 
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whatever the state may view as fair.”157  The Court rejected Arizona’s 
argument that they had any anticorruption interest, questioning the 
legislature’s finding that such interest even existed and concluding 
instead that Arizona passed campaign finance to “level the playing 
field”—which they rejected as an interest compelling enough to 
survive strict scrutiny.158 
In her dissent, Justice Elena Kagan reminded the Court of the 
importance of the information and anti-corruption interests, arguing 
that the “First Amendment’s core purpose is to foster a healthy, 
vibrant political system full of robust discussion and debate,” and that 
nothing in Arizona’s law “violates this constitutional protection.”159  
Constitutional scholar Larry Tribe echoed that sentiment, lamenting 
that the ruling “could not remotely be described as enhancing 
anyone’s freedom to speak or even to spend money on speech.  The 
Court simply reached out to restrict the freedom of states to develop 
their own way to limit corruption, voter alienation, and the 
disproportionate access of the wealthy to the candidates they 
support.”160 
But the damage was done.161  The majority in Bennett mentioned 
two states—North Carolina and Maine—whose matching funds 
provisions were also unconstitutional.162  And the opinion severely 
limited the ability of citizen-financing programs to operate in a way 
that hampers an independent organization’s ability to seek and spend 
private funds to defeat the candidate. 
Since Bennett, New York City’s model of “flexible financing”163 is 
emerging as an effective—and Constitutional164—model.  Under this 
 
 157. Id. at 2826. 
 158. Id. at 2811; see also Bamman, supra note 80, at 344. 
 159. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2830 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 160. Laurence H. Tribe, The Once-and-for-All Solution to Our Campaign Finance 
Problems—How Citizens Can Unite to Undo Citizens United, SLATE (June 13, 2012), 
http://hive.slate.com/hive/how-can-we-fix-constitution/article/the-once-and-for-all-
solution-to-our-campaign-finance-problems. 
 161. The Court’s holding in Bennett led many to suggest the bell was tolling on the 
death of campaign finance laws. See, e.g., Glenn Hudson, Think Small: The Future of 
Public Financing After Arizona Free Enterprise, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 413, 426 
(2012) (“The Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona Free Enterprise signals the death 
of traditional public financing statutes that rely on trigger funds to attract 
candidates.”). 
 162. See Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2816 n.3. 
 163. Bamman, supra note 80, at 348–49. 
 164. For a discussion of the constitutionality of the New York City model, see 
Hudson, supra note 161, at 430–31. 
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model, candidates receive funds matched to their own fundraising 
performance, instead of the expenditures of their opponent(s).  New 
York City’s program offers a voluntary public financing system for 
candidates running for municipal offices.165  Eligible candidates166 
refuse to take PAC donations and agree to limit their campaign 
spending.167  Participants raise private contributions, and the 
government then matches these private donations at a favorable 
ratio.168  New York City’s program, for example, matches funds at a 
six-to-one ratio so that if a candidate gives $100, then the government 
will add $600.169  In return, the participating candidate agrees to an 
expenditure cap, a public debate, and several other requirements.170 
This “flexible financing” promotes both the participation and 
equality interests.  It encourages small-dollar contributions 
(participation) while also promoting all donors from various 
economic classes to influence the campaign, thereby increasing a 
candidate’s “responsiveness to otherwise marginalized economic 
classes” (equality).171  The New York City model also has provisions 
to serve the information interest, requiring participating candidates to 
take place in at least one public debate and provide information for a 
voter guide.172  The drawback is that such a partial public financing 
regime does not inoculate the candidate from the corrupting 
influence of large private contributions—either directly to their 
campaign, via independent expenditures, or in the form of lobbying 
after they are elected.  But public funding levels the playing field, 
increases the competitiveness of races and has the potential to 
improve public confidence in the political process.173 
 
 165. For a detailed description of New York City’s model, see Torres-Spelliscy & 
Weisbard, supra note 119, at 238–46. 
 166. The system typically denies public funding to candidates who are not facing 
serious opposition or are unable to demonstrate viability, and cuts funding to 
candidates running in primaries with small numbers of voters. See id. at 238. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See id. at 238–39. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 239–40; see also Bamman, supra note 80, at 348–51 (describing the 
constitutionality of such a program post-Bennett). 
 171. Bamman, supra note 80, at 351. But see id. (“[In New York City,] flexible 
financing may magnify the incumbency advantage. . . .  By effectively limiting total 
expenditures, candidates that face an incumbent were unable to outspend the 
incumbent—one of the only tools proven to counteract an incumbent’s inherent 
advantage.”). 
 172. See Torres-Spelliscy & Weisbard, supra note 119, at 226. 
 173. See Clyburn, supra note 152, at 302 (noting that “an effective [public funding] 
program creates an environment where citizens with innovative ideas or community 
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Citizen-financed campaign reforms reduce the potential for private 
funders and wealthy special interests to have a corrupting influence 
on the political process.174  They incentivize citizen involvement as 
stakeholders in the campaigns that the public funds go to support, 
easing voters’ suspicion and distrust of their leaders,175 and restore 
their faith in a process that appears to be bought and paid for by 
special interests.176  Citizen-financed candidates consistently report 
that public financing improves their ability to connect with voters,177 
and data underscores that the system increases participation from 
voters who become small dollar donors.178 
 
support can build the grassroots support necessary to mount an effective campaign 
for an elective office”). 
 174. See Li, supra note 145, at 280 (“[P]olitical scandal and the fear of corruption 
have preserved public financing as an attractive option for state elections.”). 
 175. See Monica Youn, Small-Donor Public Financing in the Post-Citizens United 
Era, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 619, 634 (2011) (“In a recent GAO survey, an 
anonymous nonparticipating Arizona candidate wrote, ‘I believe the program has 
helped restore the public’s faith in the integrity of candidates.  Hopefully, many other 
states, and eventually Congress, will adopt public funding of elections.’”); see also 
Hudson, supra note 161, at 428–29 (noting that “the New York City Campaign 
Finance Act was designed to prevent corruption; but . . . also seeks ‘to expand the 
role of citizens in elections from voter to that of financier and even candidate’”). 
 176. See Youn, supra note 175, at 633.  Youn argues that a “shift to a system of 
public financing could help restore this lost faith in government,” citing several 2010 
surveys that found the influx of private contributions erode trust in government and 
lead the public to believe that political spending buys political favors.  One revealed 
that 79% believed members of Congress are controlled by those who fund their 
campaigns as opposed to just 18% who thought voters were in charge. See id.  
Another found that 70% of voters believe that “most members of Congress [are] 
willing to sell their vote for either cash or a campaign contribution.” Id. 
 177. See id. at 635 (quoting an Albuquerque, New Mexico Councilor who stated 
after running as a publicly funded candidate that with public funding, “you do a lot 
more outreach and the voters have a lot more ownership of the election process, 
because many of them have given $5 to help get a candidate qualified”). 
 178. See id. at 637–39 (describing how in New York City, over half of the 
individuals who contributed to city campaigns during the last three election cycles 
were first-time donors). 
Including more voters in the electoral process naturally leads to a larger, 
more diverse pool of donors.  For instance, the share of donor activity has 
risen in New York City’s outer boroughs; in 2009, donor activity increased 
almost six-fold in Flushing, a heavily Asian-American neighborhood that is 
home to Queens’ Chinatown.  Similarly, a scan of the occupations of 2009 
donors to New York City elections reveals a surprisingly diverse group: 
amidst the traditional lawyers and businesspeople, contributors included a 
significant number of artists, administrative assistants, barbers and 
beauticians, cab and bus operators, carpenters, police officers, students, 
nurses, and clergy. 
Id. at 637. 
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There is less of an argument to support the idea that they further 
the participation or information interest.  Arguably, citizens may be 
more inclined to participate in a democratic system in which they are 
also helping to finance the elections themselves—though recent 
evidence suggests that citizen participation is declining in existing 
public financing programs,179 and public support is at an all-time 
low.180  And there is little to suggest that citizen-financed campaigns 
will ensure that voters are better informed, because many systems of 
public financing do not and cannot limit outside funds from being 
spent on independent expenditures that will distort the marketplace 
of ideas. 
More than anything, these reforms may help ensure that our 
government furthers legislation benefitting the public.  They 
dramatically reduce the amount of time candidates and incumbents 
spend fundraising, thereby increasing their time to focus on the needs 
of their constituents. 
Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) once argued that “it would be hard 
to find much legislation enacted by any Congress that did not contain 
one or more obscure provision that served no legitimate national or 
even local interest, but which was intended only as a reward for a 
generous campaign supporter.”181  Public financing is perhaps the only 
reform that can effectively break this cycle because it minimizes the 
influence of special interest political spending, enabling policies and 
legislation to be evaluated on whether it furthers the public good 
rather than assists a recent financial backer.  Strikingly, former 
Arizona Governor Janet Napolitano explained in a 2003 speech that 
 
 179. FEC’s website states that “participation in the tax checkoff program has 
declined each year, from a high of 28.7% for 1980 returns, to 6.6% for returns filed 
with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in 2010.” Presidential Election Campaign 
Fund (PECF), FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, http://www.fec.gov/press/ 
bkgnd/fund.shtml (last visited Mar. 26, 2013). 
 180. See Doolittle, supra note 143, at 310 (“Support for public financing is at an all-
time low, with less than 15 percent of the American people checking the tax-form box 
to earmark a few dollars for the presidential fund.”) 
 181. Youn, supra note 175, at 629–30.  Senator McCain went on to emphasize that 
“[t]here’s a terrible appearance when the Generic Drug Bill, which passes by 78 votes 
through the Senate, is not allowed to be brought up in the House shortly after a huge 
fundraiser with multimillion dollar contributions from the pharmaceutical drug 
companies who are opposed to the legislation.” Id. at 630.  “Former Senator Russ 
Feingold (D-Wisconsin) similarly warned of the appearance of quid pro quo 
corruption that emerges when ‘a $ 200,000 contribution [was] given 2 days after the 
House marked up a bankruptcy bill by MBNA.’” Id. 
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her state’s public financing regime directly helped her promote health 
care reforms.  She noted that absent Arizona’s program 
I would surely have been paid visits by numerous campaign 
contributors representing pharmaceutical interests and the like, 
urging me either to shelve that idea or to create it in their image.  
All the while, they would be wielding the implied threat to yank 
their support and shop for an opponent in four years.  [Instead,] I 
was able to create this program based on one and only one variable: 
the best interests of Arizona’s senior citizens.182 
C. Reform 3: Shareholder Protections and the Anticorruption 
Interest 
Another series of reforms have emerged in the aftermath of 
Citizens United to regulate corporate political spending.  Apart from 
shareholder protection reform, other efforts have sought to reduce 
corporate political spending through limits or ban foreign-held 
corporations or corporations that contract with the state from 
spending any money to influence elections.183  Shareholder protection 
reform suggestions tend to fall into two broad categories—disclosure 
and consent—and generally seek to prohibit corporations from 
making any political expenditure unless it was disclosed to—and 
potentially approved by—the shareholders of that corporation.  
These proposals, some of which seek to create a “shareholder’s veto” 
on political spending at a corporation, could potentially also require 
corporations to disclose the amount and nature of the independent 
expenditure to each shareholder or member prior to the expenditure 
being made, and a majority of the shareholders or members would 
have to consent in writing to the expenditure in advance.  They would 
 
 182. Id. at 633 (“Similarly, the Center for Governmental Studies, which has studied 
campaign finance programs across the nation, has catalogued numerous other 
instances (in New Jersey, Maine, Los Angeles and elsewhere) where candidates and 
legislators endorse public financing for this very reason: public financing enables 
elected officials to place their constituents’ interests above special interests.”). 
 183. See, e.g., Matt A. Vega, The First Amendment Lost in Translation: 
Preventing Foreign Influence in U.S. Elections After Citizens United v. FEC, 44 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 951, 981 (2011) (describing how the federal “DISCLOSE Act 
would have extended the ban on contributions and expenditures by foreign-owned 
and foreign-controlled domestic corporations and their PACs”); see also Richard L. 
Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 605–10 
(2011); Vega, supra, at 981–1010; Carol Herdman, Note, Citizens United: 
Strengthening the First Amendment in American Elections, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 723, 
756–58 (2011).  For a discussion on limits on contributions that government 
contractors can make to state officials, see, e.g., Torres-Spelliscy & Weisbard, supra 
note 119, at 220–21. 
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give shareholders greater control over money that corporations spend 
on political advocacy are premised on the idea that when 
corporations engage in political advocacy with general treasury funds, 
they are spending shareholders’ money—or equity—on speech with 
which shareholders may disagree.  The reforms also could provide a 
constitutional avenue towards limiting corporations’ spending by 
empowering shareholders to put a stop to any political expenditures. 
Under current federal law, shareholders of U.S. corporations may 
reject—or at least express dissatisfaction with—a corporation’s 
political speech decisions either through internal mechanisms of 
corporate governance or external legal remedies available to them 
when management violates the fiduciary duties owed to shareholders.  
Noting this, the U.S. Supreme Court has been consistently reticent to 
endorse or encourage any reforms to expand shareholder authority 
over a corporation’s political expenditures.184 
In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,185 the Court reasoned 
that shareholders can “decide, through the procedures of corporate 
democracy, whether their corporation should engage in debate on 
public issues” through such things as electing a board of directors or 
“insist[ing] upon protective provisions in the corporation’s charter.”186  
Beyond that, they have the ability to file a “derivative suit to 
challenge corporate disbursements”187 or “withdraw his investment at 
any time and for any reason.”188  The Citizens United Court reiterated 
this and concluded that shareholders could address any “evidence of 
abuse” of corporate money spent on political advocacy “through the 
procedures of corporate democracy” and Internet-based disclosures 
that “can provide shareholders and citizens with the information 
needed to hold corporations and elected officials accountable for 
their positions and supporters.”189 
But the Court’s reasoning is based on the presumption that 
shareholders have access to information about any political 
expenditures a company is making.190  If corporations are not required 
 
 184. See Axelman, supra note 33, at 316–19 (describing the Court’s general 
skepticism over the government’s interest in “protecting dissenting shareholders from 
being compelled to fund corporate political speech”). 
 185. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
 186. Id. at 794–95. 
 187. Id. at 795 n.34. 
 188. Id. at 795. 
 189. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010). 
 190. See Romiti, supra note 128, at 767–69 (describing how internal mechanisms of 
corporate governance are inadequate to protect shareholders or provide disclosure of 
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to disclose their political expenditures, shareholders will be unable to 
respond in any way that enables them to “check” the spending.191  
Justice Stevens’s dissent in Citizens United offered strong reasoning 
for an expansion of shareholder power in this regard, noting that  
[w]hen corporations use general treasury funds to praise or attack a 
particular candidate for office, it is the shareholders, as the residual 
claimants, who are effectively footing the bill.  Those shareholders 
who disagree with the corporation’s electoral message may find their 
financial investments being used to undermine their political 
convictions.192 
Reformers have floated a handful of efforts on the federal level, 
but so far none have succeeded.  On January 21, 2010, the same day 
the Court handed down its decision in Citizens United, Congressman 
Alan Grayson introduced the End the Hijacking of Shareholder 
Funds Act.193  The legislation sought to require that “any expenditure 
by a public company to influence public opinion on matters not 
related to the company’s products or services” of that company 
receive the pre-authorization and approval of a “majority of the votes 
cast by shareholders.”194  About a week later, Representative Michael 
Capuano (D-Mass.) introduced the Shareholder Protection Act of 
2010195 which would require any issuer of securities to obtain “written 
affirmative authorization” from a majority of its shareholders before 
spending more than $10,000 in a given fiscal year on political 
expenditures.”196  The bill defines political expenditures very broadly 
and would include expenditures for voter registration campaigns and 
trade association dues.197  Almost simultaneously, the nonprofit 
 
corporate political spending, and noting that “the argument that shareholders can 
control political speech decisions through the election of directors is also somewhat 
illusory”). 
 191. See Jennifer S. Taub, Money Managers in the Middle: Seeing and Sanctioning 
Political Spending After Citizens United, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 443, 464 
(2012) (“[U]nder current disclosure rules and even with unlimited time and energy, it 
is impossible for even the most diligent shareholder to trace political spending by 
corporations.  Corporations are not required to disclose.  The information is simply 
not available.”). 
 192. See Citizens United, 558 U.S.. at 475 (Stevens. J., dissenting). 
 193. End the Hijacking of Shareholder Funds Act, H.R. 4487, 111th Cong. § 2 
(2010). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Shareholder Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 4537, 111th Cong. § 3 (2010). 
 196. Id. 
 197. See Robert B. Sobelman, Note, An Unconstitutional Response to Citizens 
United Mandating Shareholder Approval of Corporate Political Expenditures, 77 
BROOK. L. REV. 341, 360 (2011).  Capuano’s Shareholder Protection Act included an 
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organization Brennan Center for Justice published a similar proposal 
containing many of the same components in the Capuano bill but also 
requiring a company’s investment managers to publicly disclose how 
they voted on such political spending authorizations.198 
State efforts for reform have enjoyed some minimal success.  Laws 
in Iowa, Missouri, and Arizona require board approval before 
corporations can spend any money to influence a state election.199  
And Maryland mandates disclosure of a company’s political spending 
directly to shareholders.200  There have also been several efforts to 
persuade the Federal Securities and Exchange Commission to issue 
regulations expanding protections and authority for shareholders, or 
empower shareholders to propose policy resolutions to corporations 
that would internally prohibit the corporation from making any 
political expenditures.201 
These reforms empowering shareholder oversight of corporate 
political spending all offer a significant way within the current 
constitutional framework to reduce or eliminate corporate influence 
in the political process.  In that way, they have the strongest chance at 
furthering the government’s interest in preventing corruption.  
Mandatory shareholder approval of all corporate political 
expenditures would likely reduce the amount of money that 
corporations spend on political causes.  In addition, shareholder 
approval could “check” and thus reduce corporate spending in 
politics, thereby reducing the amount of money that corporations, in 
the aggregate, spend on political causes.  This also furthers the 
equality interest, because it would mitigate the ability of wealthy 
 
exception for corporations “whose sole business is the publication or broadcasting of 
news, commentary, literature, music, entertainment, artistic expression, scientific, 
historical or academic works, or other forms of information.” Id. at 361. 
 198. See Elizabeth Kennedy, Protecting Shareholders After Citizens United, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (July 13, 2011), http://www.brennancenter.org/ 
blog/archives/protecting_shareholders_after_citizens_united.  For an analysis that 
critiques the constitutionality of these proposals, see Sobelman, supra note 197, at 
364–80. 
 199. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-914.02(B), (E) (2012); IOWA CODE § 
68A.404(2)(a), (5)(g) (2010); MO. REV. STAT. § 130.029(1) (2012). 
 200. See MD. CODE ANN., ELECTION LAW § 13-307 (LexisNexis 2011). 
 201. For a general description of these efforts, see Romiti, supra note 128, at 749–
54; see also Taub, supra note 191, at 445–46 (noting that recently, “activist 
shareholders have encouraged disclosure by the corporations in which they invest. . . .  
These non-binding political spending disclosure resolutions, [or] ‘show me’ 
resolutions,” requires the corporation to “simply disclose past spending, including 
which officers and directors participated in the decision to spend.”). 
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corporate interests to exert undue influence over the policy decisions 
of a legislative body or elected official. 
Beyond furthering the anticorruption interest, there are also 
several reasons why shareholders would want to both know about and 
control the money their corporation spends on political interests.  As 
the Target example mentioned above suggests, not only may such 
spending fail to increase shareholder value, it also has the potential to 
damage a corporation’s stock price.202  Increasing shareholder 
authority would also minimize a current inconsistency in the law, 
where union members may object to how their union spends their 
general treasury funds but shareholders do not enjoy that same power 
of oversight.203 
D. Reform 4: Move to Amend and the Participation Interest 
In the wake of the Citizens United ruling that restrictions of 
corporate spending on election communications were 
unconstitutional, several efforts moved to amend the United States 
Constitution to clarify that money spent on political speech is not the 
equivalent of political speech.  The Court’s interpretation of the First 
Amendment of the Constitution in Citizens United is not new; a 
central premise to Buckley is that the government may not 
constitutionally regulate money spent in the political arena without 
implicating a stricter level of scrutiny.204  This has led reformers and 
political leaders to call for an amendment to the Constitution to 
formally overturn the Buckley ruling.  “Comprehensive reform can be 
passed only if there is a constitutional amendment that provides 
Congress with the authority to regulate all aspects of the campaign 
finance system,” said Senator Udall, when speaking in support of a 
Joint Resolution he co-sponsored to propose a constitutional 
 
 202. For further discussion, see Romiti, supra note 128, at 764–65. See also id. at 
765 (noting that in the Target Corporation example the company “decided to support 
a particular advocacy group allegedly based on its mission and policy goals” even 
though MN Forward’s candidate, had he been elected “still may not have voted 
according to the wishes of his corporate supporters”).  Consumer fallout soon 
followed, particularly because of the candidate’s controversial social views against 
same-sex marriage. 
 203. See Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights 
After Citizens United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800 (2012) (noting an asymmetry in the 
way in which the law treats union and corporate political spending, prohibiting a 
union from spending its general treasury funds on politics if individual employees 
object to such use, but not extending that same veto power to shareholders of 
corporations, who enjoy no right to opt out of financing corporate political activity) 
 204. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1976). 
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amendment that would authorize Congress and state legislatures to 
regulate the raising and spending of money in political campaigns.205 
Senator Udall writes that such a reform is critical to furthering the 
government’s interest in curbing corruption, arguing that “[w]ithout a 
constitutional amendment, or a reversal of Supreme Court precedent, 
special interest campaign funding will continue to corrupt our 
elections and legislative process.”206  It also serves the equality interest 
in empowering Congress to limit expenditures from financial interests 
that, when excessive, can effectively drown out peoples’ voices in the 
political process.207  Justice Stevens’s dissent in Citizens United 
warned that after the decision, “corporations with large war chests to 
deploy on electioneering may find democratically elected bodies 
becoming much more attuned to their interests.”208  The decision 
undermines the integrity of our democratic institutions and “will 
undoubtedly cripple the ability of ordinary citizens, Congress, and the 
states to adopt even limited measures to protect against corporate 
domination of the electoral process.”209 
The sheer magnitude of this reform—amending the Constitution to 
further empower Congress to regulate money in politics—is so great 
that it may be reformers’ best chance at restoring peoples’ faith in the 
electoral process.  And restoring that faith is vital to promoting 
greater citizen engagement and participation in the future.  A 
Washington Post-ABC News poll taken shortly after the decision 
 
 205. Udall, supra note 9, at 250.  The full text of the proposed Udall-Dodd 
Constitutional Amendment reads: 
Section 1.  Congress shall have power to regulate the raising and spending 
of money with respect to Federal elections, including through setting limits 
on (1) the amount of contributions to candidates for nomination for election 
to, or for election to, Federal office; and (2) the amount of expenditures that 
may be made by, in support of, or in opposition to such candidates. 
Section 2.  A State shall have power to regulate the raising and spending of 
money with respect to State elections, including through setting limits on (1) 
the amount of contributions to candidates for nomination for election to, or 
for election to, State office; and (2) the amount of expenditures that may be 
made by, in support of, or in opposition to such candidates. 
Section 3. Congress shall have power to implement and enforce this article 
by appropriate legislation. 
Id. at 251. 
 206. Id. at 252. 
 207. Id. (noting that the amendment is critical to restoring a government “of the 
people, by the people, for the people”). 
 208. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 588 U.S. 310, 455 (2010) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). 
 209. Id. at 475. 
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revealed that 80% of the American people opposed it—regardless of 
political affiliation or background.210  Piecemeal reforms, disclosure 
and the rest, may only blunt the impact of an interpretation of the 
First Amendment that so many oppose—and overturning that 
interpretation may be the only thing to sufficiently re-engage citizens 
who oppose Citizens United. 
The decision to support a constitutional amendment opens the 
question of what such an amendment should do.  To that end, 
proposals for a potential amendment take several forms.  In 2012, two 
states considered ballot proposals that offered voters an opportunity 
to call on each state’s congressional delegation to enact an 
amendment to the United States Constitution that would allow 
Congress and the states to limit campaign contributions and 
spending.211  Multiple members of Congress have proposed potential 
amendments at the federal level.212  One plan suggests that 
 
 210. See Corporations Aren’t Persons, MOVE TO AMEND, 
https://movetoamend.org/corporations-arent-persons (last visited Mar. 26, 2013) 
(“‘The poll shows remarkably strong agreement about the ruling across all 
demographic groups,’ noted Dan Eggen of the [Washington] Post. ‘The poll reveals 
relatively little difference of opinion on the issue among Democrats (85 percent 
opposed to the ruling), Republicans (76 percent), and independents (81 percent).’”). 
 211. The Colorado amendment reads: 
Shall there be amendments to the Colorado constitution and the Colorado 
revised statutes concerning support by Colorado’s legislative representatives 
for a federal constitutional amendment to limit campaign contributions and 
spending, and, in connection therewith, instructing Colorado’s congressional 
delegation to propose and support, and the members of Colorado’s state 
legislature to ratify, an amendment to the United States constitution that 
allows congress and the states to limit campaign contributions and 
spending? 
See Colo. Cong. Delegation to Support Campaign Fin. Limits, Amend. 65 (Colo. 
2012), available at http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Initiatives/ 
titleBoard/results/2011-2012/82Results.html. 
The Montana amendment states: 
With this policy, the people of Montana establish that there should be a 
level playing field in campaign spending, in part by prohibiting corporate 
campaign contributions and expenditures and by limiting political spending 
in elections.  Further, Montana’s congressional delegation is charged with 
proposing a joint resolution offering an amendment to the United States 
Constitution establishing that corporations are not human beings entitled to 
constitutional rights. 
See Initiative No. 166 (I-166) (Mt. 2012), available at 
http://sos.mt.gov/Elections/2012/BallotIssues/I-166.pdf (overruling the Citizens 
United decision). 
 212. The first, proposed by Congresswoman Donna Edwards, reads: “The 
sovereign right of the people to govern being essential to a free democracy, Congress 
and the States may regulate the expenditure of funds for political speech by any 
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corporations are not “people” for purposes of the First Amendment, 
thereby enabling Congress to restrict or completely ban the political 
speech of any corporation.213  Another includes language that states 
that “money is not speech,” and therefore that election related 
expenditures “shall not constitute protected speech.”214  Others have 
proposed a constitutional amendment that grants Congress plenary 
authority to regulate election spending in general.215 
One of the best proposals comes from renowned Constitutional 
expert and Harvard Law Professor Larry Tribe.216  Tribe’s proposed 
Twenty-Seventh Amendment would read: 
Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to forbid Congress or 
the states from imposing content-neutral limitations on private 
campaign contributions or independent political campaign 
expenditures.  Nor shall this Constitution prevent Congress or the 
states from enacting systems of public campaign financing, including 
those designed to restrict the influence of private wealth by 
offsetting campaign spending or independent expenditures with 
increased public funding.217 
No matter the precise language, scope, and frame of an 
amendment, it would do what no other proposed reform could: 
empower Congress and other entities to ban corporate spending on 
elections, prohibit various kinds of corporate expenditures, or 
regulate different kinds of corporate speech.218 
 
corporation, limited liability company, or other corporate entity.”  Senators Dodd 
and Udall introduced their own constitutional amendment, which would “authorize 
Congress to regulate the raising and spending of money for federal political 
campaigns, including independent expenditures, and allow states to regulate such 
spending at their level.” Corporations Aren’t Persons, supra note 210. 
 213. Constitutional Law scholar Larry Tribe has criticized the shortcomings of this 
language. See Tribe, supra note 160 (noting that this language demonizes 
corporations to the exclusion of other electoral interlopers).  “It’s just as bad . . . for 
lone billionaires to distort electoral results and gain disproportionate influence.  And 
it’s troubling to lump small corporations with those that accumulate gigantic war 
chests.” Id. 
 214. Id.  Tribe rejects this language as well, arguing that “some financial 
investment is essential for almost all forms of speech” and that the First Amendment 
has a role to play in inviting some level of scrutiny of “regulations imposed on 
financial backing of political expression.” Id. 
 215. See Robert Weissman, Let the People Speak: The Case for a Constitutional 
Amendment to Remove Corporate Speech from the Ambit of the First Amendment, 
83 TEMP. L. REV. 979, 999–1005 (2011). 
 216. See Tribe, supra note 160. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Weissman, supra note 215, at 999 (“[W]hile public financing and other 
desirable campaign finance reforms would strengthen the hand of candidates against 
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Tribe’s arguments in support of his amendment fall squarely in the 
corner of ensuring that average citizens have an equal voice and 
ability to influence their elected officials.  He explains that his 
amendment would enable Congress to limit expenditures made “to 
support or oppose political candidates, [which,] however nominally 
independent . . . have in practice afforded wealthy people and 
corporations grossly disproportionate access to holders of public 
office.”219  He notes that allowing such unlimited spending “is 
anathema to the foundational principle of ‘one person, one vote,’ a 
doctrine devised to root out unconscionable disparities in voter access 
to fair legislative representation.”220  Donors get “special access,” 
argues Tribe, and “the Court erodes the credibility of our 
constitutional commitment to equality of influence, undermining the 
foundations of citizen activism.”221 
David Axelrod, senior advisor to President Barack Obama, 
similarly raised the equality interest as a driving motivation for a 
constitutional amendment.  In June 2012, he stated that the Supreme 
Court’s constitutional jurisprudence in this area “is taking us back to 
the Gilded Age.  We’re back to the robber barons trying to take over 
the government.”222  Axelrod went on to suggest a constitutional 
amendment as a potential solution to address the growing inequality 
in influence, which President Obama later echoed.223 
III.  ROADMAP TO CHANGE 
Each of the above reforms independently further some of the 
aforementioned interests that are central to real reform in the 
 
corporate independent expenditures, it would do nothing to directly lessen the scope 
or impact of such expenditures . . . corporations would still have enormous power to 
influence elections and no limit on how much they might spend.  Thus, even were all 
of the reforms mentioned here put in place, Citizens United would continue to cast a 
dark shadow over American democracy.  The only way to fully repair the damage 
from the decision is to undo it.”). 
 219. Tribe, supra note 157. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Ruth Marcus, Plan B on Citizens United?, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2012, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ruth-marcus-do-democrats-have-a-plan-b-
on-citizens-united/2012/09/04/f7547b5a-f6d6-11e1-8b93-c4f4ab1c8d13_story.html. 
 223. See id. (describing the unlimited spending unleashed by Citizens United as 
“fundamentally threaten[ing] to overwhelm the political process over the long run 
and drown out the voices of ordinary citizens,” and stating that “[o]ver the longer 
term, I think we need to seriously consider mobilizing a constitutional amendment 
process to overturn Citizens United”). 
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campaign finance arena.  Notably, some reforms, like disclosure, are 
stronger for meeting the goal of promoting an informed electorate.  
Others, like citizen-financed campaigns, strongly further the interest 
in ensuring a government whose policies best reflect the one person, 
one vote principal in the Constitution.  Yet for the most part, efforts 
to promote each reform proceed independently of one another, with 
a great deal of attention on pushing for change on the federal level.  
The former is problematic because it leads to a tendency to focus on 
one proposal at the expense of supporting others.  The latter is 
understandable, as success at the federal level would have a national 
impact and could lead to reforms on the state level.  But in the 
current political climate, states offer better opportunities for reform 
than the federal government. 
This section offers three recommendations to reformers seeking to 
advance an agenda that develops a role for money in politics that 
promotes the equality, informational, participatory, and anti-
corruption interests. 
A. Recommendation 1: A Comprehensive Plan 
Perhaps most striking about the above reforms is that each weighs 
heavily in advancing one of the four interests discussed.  Policies that 
will lead to better disclosure of money in politics will help voters be 
more informed.  They enable citizens to evaluate a politician’s actions 
through the lens of the donations they receive, and evaluate their 
leadership based upon which organizations support them.  Disclosure 
also enables voters to evaluate a candidate through revealing 
demographic data about their supporters and better analyze a 
candidate’s motivation and commitment.  Most citizen-financed 
election schemes directly further the equality interest224 because they 
mitigate or all but eliminate the potential for a small number of 
donors to exert undue or excessive influence over the political figure.  
And to the extent that the “public” is funding the campaign, then 
presumably the public is the group to which the elected official will be 
most beholden to once elected. 
Both of those policies arguably also limit the ability of elected 
officials to be corrupted; disclosure provides a needed deterrent for 
 
 224. Bamman, supra note 80, at 338 (“[P]ublic funding limits the corrupting 
influence of large private contributions. If candidates may receive only very small 
qualifying contributions, then special interests will not be able to influence candidates 
through campaign contributions.”). 
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elected officials and donors, who will know that any quid pro quo 
agreement will be public knowledge, and public financing reduces the 
need for candidates to rely on donations from the beginning.  But 
neither of these policies alone will deter corruption, as the money will 
still be able to exert undue influence if, say, a corporation is willing to 
spend it.  As the adage goes, money will always find a way to 
influence the process.  That is, unless shareholders of the corporations 
are empowered in the same way that union members are with the 
authority to veto or reject corporate decisions to spend treasury funds 
on political communications.  Reforms empowering shareholder 
oversight of corporate political spending offer a significant way within 
the current constitutional framework to reduce or eliminate corporate 
influence in the political process.  In that way, they have the strongest 
chance at furthering the government’s interest in preventing 
corruption. 
That said, as long as the U.S. Supreme Court holds that money 
spent on political speech is the equivalent of speech itself, each of 
these reforms must be limited in its reach and scope; they must be 
narrowly tailored and serve compelling government interests in order 
to justify any burden they place on the First Amendment protections.  
For that reason, other reforms may only blunt the impact of an 
interpretation of the First Amendment that so many oppose—and 
overturning that interpretation may be the only thing that sufficiently 
restores citizens’ faith in the political process.  Restoring that faith is 
critical for ensuring that people are participating and engaged in our 
democracy. 
For all of those reasons, it is crucial for reformers to develop a 
strategic plan to promote all four of these reforms instead of 
proceeding with a piecemeal approach that champions one reform 
above others.  Some may proceed at the local level, some via 
initiative, and others via legislation, but all must be part of a 
comprehensive and coordinated drive to implement a plan where, in 
every state and at the federal level, these reforms are all in place and 
enforced. 
B. Recommendation 2: States as the Laboratories for Reform 
“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system,” wrote 
Justice Louis Brandeis in 1932, “that a single courageous state may, if 
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and 
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economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”225  The 
concept of states as the laboratories for political reform can and 
should inform questions of institutional choice for advocates seeking 
to advance a comprehensive plan for structural democratic changes.  
Should reformers look to change things at the federal level, and hope 
for a trickle down effect to the states?  Should advocates seek change 
through legislation, resolution, state-based ballot proposals, or 
regulatory reform via federal agencies? 
As Brandeis suggests, states can provide models for the 
implementation of structural changes and can inform how larger 
jurisdictions or national reform can best proceed.226  It is also often 
times more efficient to seek change at the state or local level, where 
there may be less barriers and obstructionism than on the federal 
level.  In fact, the federal government rarely acts to address 
institutional reforms, and has done so historically only in reaction to a 
major crisis.  It was Watergate in the 1970s that prompted Congress to 
strengthen the Federal Election Campaign Act,227 and the Bipartisan 
Campaign Finance Reform Act in 2002 was enacted “on the heels of 
the infamous Enron scandal.”228  States provide reformers with an 
opportunity to bypass Washington gridlock and enact reforms—
oftentimes through the direct democracy opportunities that many 
states provide through their respective referendum processes.229 
 
 225. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
 226. Justice Brandeis coined the oft-used term that states are "laboratories" of 
democracy, suggesting that states are best adept at creating new solutions to 
problems that the federal government is unable to effectively address. See, e.g., New 
State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J dissenting); see also Michael S. Greve, 
Laboratories of Democracy: Anatomy of a Metaphor, AEI ONLINE (Mar. 31, 2001), 
http://www.aei.org/article/politics-and-public-opinion/elections/laboratories-of-
democracy/. 
 227. See Introduction, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, http://www.fec.gov/ 
info/intro.htm (last visited May 7, 2013) (“[I]n 1974, as a reaction to the events of 
Watergate, Congress enacted the 1974 amendments to the FECA . . . .” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 228. Russ Feingold, The Money Crisis: How Citizens United Undermines Our 
Elections and the Supreme Court, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 145 (2012), available at 
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/money-crisis; see also Pub. L. 107-155, 116 
Stat. 81 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 2 and 47 U.S.C.). 
 229. See Clyburn, supra note 152, at 309 (“PCF programs foster wider participation 
in our representative democratic system of government and restore public trust and 
confidence in our elected officials. It is only logical for this type of reform for the 
people to come from the people.”).  For a list of all states that allow referenda 
reforms see BALLOT INITIATIVE STRATEGY CENTER, http://ballot.org. 
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In the late 1990s, the initiative process was instrumental to the 
enactment of term limits for state legislators and executives across the 
country.230  And though term limits for members of Congress were 
ultimately struck down as unconstitutional,231 they have become the 
norm in several states.  The state of Oregon also provides a singularly 
prime example of how a vibrant initiative process can yield significant 
institutional and political reform. 
Citizens in several states have already utilized the ballot 
referendum process as a vehicle for reform.232  Citizen-financed 
elections were instituted in Maine and later Arizona after coalitions 
gathered signatures and passed a ballot proposal to create them.233  
And in 2012, Montana and Colorado invited voters statewide to vote 
for resolutions calling on Congress to amend the U.S. Constitution to 
overturn the Supreme Court’s holdings in Buckley v. Valeo234 and 
Citizens United.235  Reformers should build on and expand these 
efforts to promote a comprehensive package of reforms—a voters’ 
“Bill of Rights” of sorts—in the states that allow referenda and 
initiatives.236 
C. Recommendation 3: Broad-Based Citizen-Led Coalition of 
Support 
Finally, any successful effort for systemic reform must be rooted in 
a broad-based citizen-led coalition of support.  Each of these reforms 
taken together will dramatically change our democratic institutions 
for the better, but there are many well-funded, well-organized, and 
entrenched interests who benefit and yield power and influence 
through the status quo.  For that reason, citizen-based support must 
be built upon partnerships with educational institutions; corporations; 
 
 230. See Term Limits on the Ballot, BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Term_limits_on_the_ballot (last visited Mar. 23, 
2013). 
 231. See generally U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995). 
 232. Clyburn, supra note 152, at 309–10 (reasoning that “the initiative route 
provides for the vote of the people and saves the time and energy of pursuing the 
alternative methods”). 
 233. For further discussion of the efforts in Maine and Arizona, see id. at 309–13 
 234. 424 U.S. 1, 263–64 (1976). 
 235. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 236. See also Clyburn, supra note 152, at 310 (detailing “positive synergistic 
reasons for the initiative approach” for political reforms including “educating the 
public” and giving them a specific action they can take—voting for a proposal—to 
“stop [big money] from buying every election”). 
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small business leaders; business organizations; industry associations; 
labor unions; elected leaders; opinion leaders; civic and service 
organizations; community-based organizations, including community 
foundations; faith-based organizations; parent, student, and advocacy 
groups; and economic development entities.  The broader the base of 
support for these reforms, the stronger the chance of success. 
For example, Arizona’s citizen-led initiative successfully enacted 
the state’s Clean Elections Act in 1998, but efforts to build support 
for the proposal began three years earlier.237  In 1995, a good 
government organization called Arizona Citizen Action (ACA) 
formed a partnership with Arizona State University and began 
hosting conferences at various educational institutions throughout the 
state to build support for a ballot proposal to create a system of 
public financing for state elections.238  ACA soon partnered with other 
nonpartisan organizations like the League of Women Voters-
Arizona, United We Stand-Arizona, several prominent individual 
business leaders, legal and constitutional experts, and current and 
past Arizona elected officials.239  The coalition collectively adopted 
the name “Arizonans for Clean Elections,” and worked for a number 
of years to draft language and gather signatures for the initiative 
before successfully winning their initiative campaign in November 
1998.240 
Recent efforts in New York to reform the state’s campaign finance 
regime have attempted to mirror and improve upon Arizona’s 
success, building an even broader coalition of support.  A variety of 
individuals have come together under the umbrella of a coalition 
called New York Leadership for Accountable Government.241  The 
group has gained attention, credibility, and support in part because it 
includes support from some of the state’s wealthiest donors, including 
Chris Hughes, a founder of Facebook, and other “deep-pocketed 
business leaders to whom lawmakers typically turn for high-dollar 
donations.”242  The coalition also includes a number of former public 
 
 237. See Clean Elections Institute, Inc., ARIZ. COMMUNITY FOUND., 
http://www.azfoundation.org/catalog/org.shtml?org_id=12457 (last visited Mar. 26, 
2013). 
 238. See id. 
 239. See id. 
 240. See id. 
 241. NY LEAD, http://www.nylead.org (last visited Mar. 26, 2013). 
 242. Thomas Kaplan, Wealthy Donors Join Effort to Improve Campaign Finance 
System, N.Y. TIMES CITY ROOM (Feb 15, 2012, 4:16 PM), 
http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/15/wealthy-donors-join-effort-to-improve-
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officials, including former New York City mayor Edward I. Koch, and 
William Donaldson, a former chairman of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, and celebrity endorsers like Sam Waterston 
of the television shows Law and Order and The Newsroom.243  Such a 
range of collection of individuals has enabled this coalition to gain 
substantial credibility and support statewide as they work towards 
organizing citizen support for campaign finance reform in their state. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the founding of our democracy, reformers have pushed 
towards a more perfect democracy.  In the past century, many of 
those efforts have focused on building a political infrastructure that 
ensures that all voices are heard, voters are engaged and informed, 
and our elected officials are incorruptible.  Much must occur to bring 
us closer to that ideal, and the urgency has only increased in the years 
following the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United 
v. FEC.244  The myriad of state and federal efforts in the years since 
Citizens United seek to mitigate or address the impact of money in 
American elections.  But to be successful, these efforts must be 
comprehensive, coordinated, and involve citizens in building broad-
based coalitions of support to push for reforms in states.  By doing so, 
they can build a groundswell of effective support for changes on the 
local, state, and national level. 
 
 
campaign-finance-system/ (noting that the group includes “prominent individuals 
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